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THE ILLUSORY EIGHTH AMENDMENT
JOHN F. STINNEFORD*
Although there is no obvious doctrinal connection between the Supreme
Court’s Miranda jurisprudence and its Eighth Amendment excessive
punishments jurisprudence, the two are deeply connected at the level of
methodology. In both areas, the Supreme Court has been criticized for creating
“prophylactic” rules that invalidate government actions because they create a
mere risk of constitutional violation. In reality, however, both sets of rules
deny constitutional protection to a far greater number of individuals with
plausible claims of unconstitutional treatment than they protect.
This dysfunctional combination of over- and underprotection arises from the
Supreme Court’s use of implementation rules as a substitute for constitutional
interpretation. A growing body of scholarship has shown that constitutional
adjudication involves at least two distinct judicial activities: interpretation
and implementation. Prophylactic rules are defensible as implementation tools
that are necessary to reduce error costs in constitutional adjudication. This
Article contributes to implementation rules theory by showing that
constitutional interpretation, defined as a receptive and non-instrumental
effort to understand constitutional meaning, normally must precede
constitutional implementation.
When the Supreme Court constructs
implementation rules without first interpreting the Constitution, the rules
appear arbitrary and overreaching because they do not have a demonstrable
connection to constitutional meaning. Such rules also narrow the scope of the
Constitution itself, denying protection to any claimant who does not come
within the rules. The only way to remedy this dysfunction and provide
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meaningful protection across a broad range of cases is to interpret the
Constitution before implementing it.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s current approach to the Eighth Amendment
is often described as a paradigm of improper judicial legislation.1
1. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2477 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Court for invalidating mandatory life sentences for
juvenile offenders, on the ground that that “determining the appropriate sentence
for a teenager convicted of murder presents grave and challenging questions of
morality and social policy” and that the courts’ role “ is to apply the law, not to
answer such questions”); Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword:
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The Court has invalidated the sentencing practices of dozens of states
and the federal government by declaring that imposition of the death
penalty or life sentences with no possibility of parole for various
classes of offense or offender is unconstitutional,2 while boldly
proclaiming its own independence from the Eighth Amendment’s
original meaning3 and even—increasingly—from current societal
standards of decency.4 It is less often noted, however, that these
decisions cover only a tiny subset of felony cases. Outside this group,
the Court takes precisely the opposite approach to claims of excessive
punishment. It not only refrains from judicial legislation, but has
abandoned judicial review altogether.5 In such cases, the Court
defers to the legislature not only as to whether a given punishment is
excessive, but as to the definition of excessiveness itself.6
The appearance of judicial activism has provoked inter-branch
resentment and reaction, fueling our ongoing societal pathology of
overcriminalization and overpunishment.7 The extreme deference
A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 90 (2005) (describing Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005), which invalidated the death penalty for juveniles, as “a naked
political judgment”); Eric J. Segall, Reconceptualizing Judicial Activism as Judicial
Responsibility: A Tale of Two Justice Kennedys, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 709, 747 (2009) (“The
problem with decisions like . . . Roper . . . is that they demonstrate that the Supreme
Court quite often fails to act like a Court and instead behaves like some other kind of
political institution.”).
2. See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460, 2474–75 (invalidating the sentencing
practices of twenty-eight states and the federal government concerning mandatory
life sentences for juvenile homicide offenders); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,
2023, 2034 (2010) (invalidating the sentencing practices of thirty-seven states, the
District of Columbia, and the federal government concerning life sentences for
juvenile non-homicide offenders); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426, 447
(invalidating the six state statutes authorizing the death penalty for non-homicide
offenses against individuals), modified on denial of reh’g, 554 U.S. 945 (2008); Roper,
543 U.S. at 564, 568 (invalidating the sentencing practices of twenty states
concerning the death penalty for offenders who were younger than eighteen when
they committed the offense).
3. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (“A claim that
punishment is excessive is judged not by the standards that prevailed . . . when the
Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail.”); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (asserting that the Eighth
Amendment should be interpreted according to “the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society”).
4. See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (“Community consensus, while
‘entitled to great weight,’ is not itself determinative of whether a punishment is
cruel and unusual.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kennedy, 554 U.S. at
421 (“Consensus is not dispositive.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 (“[I]n cases
involving a consensus, our own judgment is ‘brought to bear,’ by asking whether
there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its
legislators.” (citation omitted)).
5. See infra Part III.A.
6. See infra Part III.C.
7. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
780, 849–50 (2006) [hereinafter Stuntz, Political Constitution] (“The Supreme Court
decided to regulate policing and procedure, and the politicians responded with a
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underlying this appearance has prevented the courts from protecting
criminal offenders from the harsher sentences that this pathology has
caused.8 For most offenders, the Eighth Amendment is an illusion,
and a harmful one at that.
This Article shows that the illusory Eighth Amendment is the result
of the Supreme Court’s decision to use implementation rules as a
substitute for constitutional interpretation. For the purposes of this
Article, an implementation rule is a rule for adjudicating
constitutional cases that is not itself required or logically entailed by
the meaning of the Constitution. Over the past thirty years, scholars
have shown that implementation rules are a necessary and even
ubiquitous feature of constitutional adjudication.9 The primary
purpose of such rules is to minimize cost, including both the cost of
adjudicative error and the social cost arising from the underlying
constitutional violation.10
Surprisingly, the implementation rules literature has paid little
attention to the nature of constitutional interpretation beyond
defining it as the effort to determine constitutional meaning.11 This

forty-year backlash of overcriminalization and overpunishment.”); see also, e.g., Erik
Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005) (describing
the overcriminalization phenomenon and critiquing it from a libertarian
perspective); Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 537 (2012) (arguing that courts have contributed to the
overcriminalization phenomenon by construing poorly phrased criminal statutes
expansively); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 509–10 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics] (arguing that
criminal liability continues to expand at the state and federal level because
prosecutorial discretion, coupled with the deference afforded to the legislature,
prevents courts from limiting it).
8. See infra Part III.C.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190,
192, 193 & n.12 (1988) (arguing that courts regularly devise rules to account for
both “constitutional values . . . [and] the institutional difficulties that courts face in
advancing those values”).
11. See infra Part II.A.
The distinction between interpretation and
implementation is similar to the distinction that “new originalist” scholars such as
Randy Barnett, Lawrence Solum, and Keith Whittington make between
interpretation and construction. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and
Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011) (advocating the “new
originalist” distinction between constitutional interpretation and construction);
Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
923, 973 (2009) (describing interpretation as “[t]he activity of determining the
linguistic meaning—or semantic content—of a legal text” and construction as “[t]he
activity of translating the semantic content of a legal text into legal rules,
paradigmatically in cases where the meaning of the text is vague”); Keith E.
Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 120–
21 (2010) (“There will be occasions . . . when the Constitution as written cannot in
good faith be said to provide a determinate answer to a given question. This is the
realm of construction. The process of interpretation may be able to constrain the
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is an important gap in the literature because the use of
implementation rules raises legitimacy and efficacy questions that can
An
only be answered with reference to interpretation.12
implementation rule enjoys the strongest claim to legitimacy if it
implements the meaning of the Constitution rather than the court’s
own substantive policy judgment.13 An implementation rule is
effective to the extent it minimizes the costs arising from erroneous
application of constitutional meaning.14 Neither legitimacy nor
efficacy questions can be answered without some understanding of
the nature of constitutional meaning and the proper methods to
interpret it.15
This Article argues that the purpose of constitutional
interpretation is to determine “voter’s meaning.”16 Voter’s meaning
is the meaning imparted to the text by those bodies of lawmakers
with authority to ratify the Constitution or constitutional
amendments.17 Voter’s meaning does not include the private
intentions of the various lawmakers involved in framing and
ratification.18 A vote in favor of the Constitution, like a vote in favor
of any other law, signifies that the voter knows and consents to the
fact that the public meaning of the text will have legal force.19
Interpretation of the original public meaning of the document is thus
sufficient to determine both the substantive policy judgments
contained in the text and the manner in which the text directs those

available readings of the text and limit the permissible set of political options, but
the interpreter may not be able to say that the text demands a specific result.”).
Although the present Article ultimately concludes, consistent with the “new
originalist” position, that interpretation is properly understood as discernment of the
Constitution’s original public meaning, it does not adopt this position as a starting
point. Rather, this Article starts from the perspective of implementation rules
theory. It argues that implementation rules, as described by scholars such as Mitchell
Berman, Richard Fallon Jr. and Kermit Roosevelt III, can neither perform their
accuracy-enhancing function nor establish their own legitimacy without reference to
a conception of constitutional interpretation that is distinct from constitutional
implementation. This Article further argues that the conception of constitutional
interpretation that best serves implementation rules theory is the discernment of
original public meaning. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part I.B.1.
14. See Strauss, supra note 10, at 193.
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. “Voter’s meaning,” as used in this Article, is a particular instance of “utterer’s
meaning,” described more fully below. Infra Part II.A.1.
17. See infra Part II.A.1; see also, Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375 n.130 (1981) (“[T]he intention of the ratifiers, not the
Framers, is in principle decisive . . . .”).
18. See infra Part II.A.1.
19. See infra Part II.A.1.
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judgments to be embodied in practice.20 At a minimum, this requires
an effort to determine the semantic content, grammatical and
structural relations, and historical context of the words contained in
this document.
Implementation rules are what courts use when something more is
needed after constitutional interpretation has been exhausted. The
efficacy and legitimacy of such rules depend on the Court’s effort to
obtain everything it can from interpretation before having recourse
to rulemaking. Without such an effort, courts cannot reliably use
implementation rules to minimize error costs because such rules’
relationship to constitutional meaning will be unknown. Worse,
unless courts adequately interpret the Constitution before creating
implementation rules, such rules will necessarily reflect the
substantive policy judgment of some current governmental actor
(usually the Court or the legislature) rather than the judgment
embodied in the Constitution itself.21
This brings us back to the illusory Eighth Amendment. A closer
look at the Supreme Court’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
jurisprudence reveals two important interpretive failures: First, the
Court failed to interpret the term “unusual,” transforming the Clause
into an irredeemably vague prohibition of “cruel punishments.”22
Second, as a result of this failure, the Court withdrew its traditional
definition of “excessive” punishments, which is the most important
category of cruel and unusual punishments.23 The Court has
replaced the meaning of these concepts with two opposing
implementation rules. In cases involving imprisonment of adults,24
20. See infra Part II.A.1. This Article does not address the question of whether
the “legal meaning” of the Constitution is fully exhausted by the semantic meaning
of the text. Rather, it makes the more modest claim (in line with Lawrence Solum
and other originalist scholars) that the semantic meaning of the text contributes to
the Constitution’s legal meaning, so that any effort to adjudicate constitutional
questions without resorting to textual interpretation will lead to serious dysfunction.
See, e.g., Solum, supra note 11, at 953 (“We can use the term ‘contribution’ to denote
the relationship between semantic content—the linguistic meaning of the text—and
legal content—the doctrines or rules of constitutional law.”); cf. Lee J. Strang,
Originalism and the “Challenge of Change”: Abduced-Principle Originalism and Other
Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 927, 966 (2009) (arguing that the Constitution, viewed in light of its
original meaning, “embodies numerous authoritative, prudential, social-ordering
decisions that have permitted our society to pursue the common good in a
reasonably effective manner”).
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.C.
24. This category includes juveniles convicted in the adult system, so long as they
are sentenced to terms less severe than life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (invalidating mandatory
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the Court applies an apparently irrebuttable presumption of
constitutionality.25 In cases involving the death penalty for nonhomicide offenses, for juveniles and for the intellectually disabled,
and in cases involving juveniles sentenced to life without possibility of
parole, the Court applies an apparently irrebuttable presumption of
unconstitutional excessiveness.26 These presumptions, given in the
absence of interpretation, amount to a delegation of substantive
policymaking from the Constitution to a current governmental
actor. In one set of cases, the legislature gets to decide what the
constitutional limits of punishment are; in the other, the Court
does. In neither case does constitutional meaning drive the
decision.
As a result, the legitimacy and efficacy of both
presumptions are highly questionable.
This problem will not be resolved by more rulemaking, but only by
more interpretation.27 As I have previously shown, the word
“unusual” in the Eighth Amendment does have independent
meaning:
it means “contrary to long usage.”28
The Eighth
Amendment does not vaguely forbid cruel punishments: it specifically
forbids punishments that are cruel and contrary to long usage or cruel
and new.29 Recognition of this additional meaning would enable
the Court to decide questions of ordinal and cardinal
proportionality more accurately and without unduly broad
presumptions of constitutionality or unconstitutionality. 30 As a
result, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause would be more
effective, and the politics of criminal law would be at least slightly
less pathological.31
Part I of this Article describes the central claims of implementation
rules theory, using the paradigmatic case of Miranda v. Arizona32 as
the primary lens through which to view this area of scholarship. Part
II describes the characteristics that distinguish interpretation from
life sentences without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders);
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (invalidating life sentences without
the possibility of parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (invalidating the death penalty for juveniles).
25. See infra Part III.D.1.
26. See infra Part III.D.2.
27. See infra Part III.F.
28. John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment
as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1745 (2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
29. See id. at 1745–46; see also infra Part III.F.
30. See infra Part III.F.
31. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 7, at 509–10 (describing several
pathologies associated with the American criminal justice system).
32. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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implementation, demonstrates that the Supreme Court laid down
implementation rules in Miranda without first interpreting the
meaning of “compelled,” and links much of the subsequent
dysfunction surrounding Miranda to this interpretive failure. Part III
shows that the Supreme Court’s “excessive punishment” cases under
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause involve the same kind of
interpretive failure that occurred in Miranda and seem to be on track
for creating the same kinds of dysfunction. This Part also shows how
interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause can
resolve the worst elements of this dysfunction.
I.

IMPLEMENTATION RULES

A. Miranda and the Debate over Prophylactic Rules
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that when an
individual is subjected to custodial interrogation, the police must
warn him that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
will be used against him in court, that he has the right to an attorney,
and that the state will pay for an attorney if he cannot afford one.33 If
the individual invokes his right to silence or to counsel, all
questioning must stop.34 The police may interrogate the individual
only if they obtain a valid waiver of his rights to silence and counsel.35
If the police violate these rules, any statements obtained from such
interrogation will be excluded from evidence at trial.36 The basis of
the Court’s ruling was the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination.37
The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda was unusual in many
respects. The opinion was almost entirely forward-looking. The
Court did not discuss the facts surrounding the confessions under
review until the very end of the opinion38 and made no finding that
these confessions had been given involuntarily.39 Instead, it held that
the risk arising from the “inherently compelling pressures” associated
with custodial interrogation required the use of the “procedural
safeguards” described above.40 The Court asserted that, in the future,

33. Id. at 444.
34. Id. at 444–45.
35. Id. at 444.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 439.
38. See id. at 491–99.
39. See id. at 457 (“In these cases, we might not find the defendants’ statements to
have been involuntary in traditional terms.”).
40. Id. at 444, 467; see supra note 33.
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it would order the exclusion of any statement obtained in violation of
these safeguards even if it could be shown that the defendant was
fully aware of his rights.41 Finally, the Court seemed to offer Congress
and state legislatures a limited power to revise its holding, stating that
they “are free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege, so
long as they are fully as effective” as those imposed by the Court.42
Miranda provoked a wide range of responses in both the political
and legal realms.43 Two of the most important responses may be
described as a structural critique and a pragmatic defense.
Proponents of the structural critique accused the Miranda Court of
engaging in judicial legislation that violated the Constitution’s
structural limitations on the judicial role.44
The basic idea,
41. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 (“[W]e will not pause to inquire in individual
cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given.”).
42. Id. at 490.
43. See, e.g., THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING (Richard A. Leo &
George C. Thomas III eds., 1998) (collecting articles debating the legitimacy and
efficacy of Miranda); Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417,
1419 (1985) (“Miranda was not a wise or necessary decision, nor has Miranda proved
to be, as is generally contended, a harmless one.” (footnote omitted)); Paul G.
Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 390
(1996) (arguing that “Miranda has significantly harmed law enforcement efforts in
this country”); Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of
Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100, 101 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme
Court’s use of “prophylactic rules” in Miranda and other cases “raise[s] a question of
constitutional legitimacy”); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1975) (arguing that
cases like Miranda demonstrate that “a surprising amount of what passes as
authoritative constitutional ‘interpretation’ is best understood as something of a
quite different order—a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules
drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various
constitutional provisions; in short, a constitutional common law”); Lawrence
Rosenthal, Against Orthodoxy: Miranda Is Not Prophylactic and the Constitution Is Not
Perfect, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 579, 585 (2007) (arguing that Miranda directly and effectively
prevents compulsion in custodial interrogation); George C. Thomas III, Separated at
Birth but Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1081, 1083 (2001) (arguing the Miranda and its progeny can best be understood as
“due process notice” cases); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect:
Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 505–06
(1996) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect] (challenging Paul Cassell’s
claim that Miranda harms law enforcement); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering
Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1987) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Reconsidering
Miranda] (defending Miranda against a U.S. Department of Justice report that called
for it to be overruled); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV.
1519, 1521 (2008) [hereinafter Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda] (arguing that
Miranda is “largely dead” as a source of protection for criminal suspects); Charles D.
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 112 (1998) [hereinafter
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda] (arguing that the Supreme Court should characterize
Miranda rules as constitutionally required rather than prophylactic and should
expand the scope of evidence excluded under Miranda).
44. This critique was vividly illustrated by Judge Henry Friendly, who
“translate[d]” Miranda into the form of a statute entitled, “An Act to implement the
provision of the Fifth Amendment that ‘No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.’” HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 267–
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articulated most forcefully by legal scholar Joseph Grano and Justice
Scalia, is that Miranda improperly required federal and state law
enforcement to follow a set of “prophylactic rules”—that is, “courtcreated rule[s] that can be violated without violating the Constitution
itself.”45 Such rules are improper because the Constitution does not
empower judges to create extra-constitutional rules and enforce them
against other governmental actors; it only empowers judges to
enforce the Constitution itself.46 Miranda’s prophylactic rules thus
violated principles of separation of powers and federalism.47
Defenders of Miranda, most notably Professor David Strauss,
answered the structural critique with a pragmatic defense. In an
essay entitled The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, Strauss asserted that
rules like those articulated in Miranda “are not exceptional measures
of questionable legitimacy but are a central and necessary feature of
constitutional law.”48
Strauss argued that courts deciding
constitutional cases regularly devise rules that take into account “not
only the constitutional values at stake, but also the institutional
difficulties that courts face in advancing those values.”49 Such
68 (1967); see also, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the new required procedural safeguards discourage confessions and demonstrate a
lack of judicial restraint); Raymond L. Spring, The Nebulous Nexus: Escobedo,
Miranda, and the New 5th Amendment, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 428, 442 (1967) (“[T]he court
has allowed its moral judgment to force it beyond interpretation of the Constitution
and into the realm of amendment.”).
45. Joseph D. Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor
Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174, 176–77 (1988) (arguing that the prophylactic
nature of the Miranda rules undermines their legitimacy); see Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 445–46 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Dickerson
majority’s reading of Miranda wrongly implied that the Supreme Court “has the
power, not merely to apply the Constitution but to expand it”). Other scholars have
also described the Miranda rules as prophylactic. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 141 n.34 (2001) (noting that the Supreme Court
itself has referred to Miranda’s prescriptions as “prophylactic”); David Cole, The Value
of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of
Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 55–56 (describing Miranda as a “noteworthy example[]”
of the Supreme Court’s power to create prophylactic rules); David Huitema,
Miranda: Legitimate Response to Contingent Requirements of the Fifth Amendment, 18 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 263–64 (2000) (defending the Supreme Court’s authority to
create prophylactic Miranda rules); Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure and
the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L. REV. 465, 471 (1999) (“A ‘prophylactic’ rule is not a
dirty word. Sometimes such rules are necessary and proper. The privilege against
self-incrimination, no less than other constitutional rights, needs ‘breathing space.’
And prophylactic rules may be the best way to provide it.”).
46. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 446 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the claimed
power to create constitutional prophylactic rules as “an immense and frightening
anti-democratic power [that] does not exist”).
47. See Grano, supra note 44, at 123–24 (arguing that the Supreme Court does
not have supervisory authority over state courts and may not legitimately impose
prophylactic rules to govern their procedures).
48. Strauss, supra note 10, at 190.
49. Id. at 192.
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difficulties include “error costs,”50 “administrative costs,”51 and
Strauss argued that instrumental
“institutional capacities.”52
considerations permeate virtually all constitutional doctrine and
therefore there is nothing illegitimate or even noteworthy about the
Miranda rules.53 Strauss’s argument has been read to imply that it is
pointless even to distinguish between the “meaning” of the
Constitution and the rules judges devise to implement or enforce it.54
From a pragmatic perspective, the Constitution’s meaning is its
implementation—and therefore there is no such thing as a
“prophylactic rule.”55
Miranda’s structural critique and pragmatic defense largely talked
past each other. Each made points the other could not answer. It is
undoubtedly true that judges—including “originalists” like Justice
Scalia—use rules to implement the Constitution that could be
characterized as prophylactic.56 But it is also true, as Grano and
Scalia argued, that the Constitution does not give judges a freefloating power to create new extra-constitutional rights.57
B. Breaking the Impasse: Constitutional Implementation Rules
The debate described above presented itself as a battle over the
proper methods of constitutional interpretation: must judges restrict
themselves to enforcing the meaning of the constitutional text, or
may they announce constitutional rules that sweep more broadly than
the text? In recent years, however, scholars have increasingly
recognized that constitutional adjudication involves at least two
50. Id. at 193.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 207.
53. See id. at 204 (arguing that the “prophylactic approach” is a “normal part of
constitutional law”).
54. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 45–46
(2004) (“Prophylactic rules are ubiquitous, [Strauss] says, not because courtannounced doctrine consists of lots of outputs that overprotect court-interpreted
constitutional meaning, but because there is only one sort of output—‘constitutional
doctrine’—much of which has the same ‘prophylactic’ relationship to ‘the real,
noumenal Constitution’ as does Miranda. Viewed in this light, then, Strauss’s
contention is not so much that prophylactic rules (in Grano’s sense) are ubiquitous,
but that they are nonexistent.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Strauss, supra note 10,
at 207–08)).
55. Id.
56. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What
the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1670–71 (2005) (describing Justice Scalia’s implicit
endorsement of a prophylactic constitutional rule in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259
(2000)).
57. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Strauss himself acknowledged
that a constitutional rule based simply on the Court’s judgment that it will make
the world “a better place” would have a “legitimacy problem.” Strauss, supra note
10, at 194.
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distinct judicial activities: interpretation and implementation.58 The
key insight is that even the most concrete constitutional provision
cannot be enforced without the use of judicially created rules that
help us determine whether the provision has been violated.59 For
example, although the Constitution’s age requirement for United
States senators is clear and unambiguous,60 a court could not decide a
case challenging a candidate’s compliance with this requirement
without employing implementation rules that do not themselves flow
directly from the Constitution. For example, who should bear the
burden of proof? How strong should that burden be? Should the
court employ a presumption of compliance or noncompliance? If so,
should such a presumption either limit or broaden the types of
evidence considered sufficient to establish or negate the claim?
None of these questions can be answered simply through
interpretation of Article I, Section 3—but they must be answered
to adjudicate the claim. Even in cases presenting no interpretive
problem, implementation rules are necessary and (to quote
Strauss) “ubiquitous.”61

58. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 54, at 58 & n.192 (distinguishing between
“constitutional operative proposition[s]” and “constitutional decision rule[s]”);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 57 (1997) (“[I]dentifying the ‘meaning’ of the
Constitution is not the Court’s only function. A crucial mission of the Court is to
implement the Constitution successfully. In service of this mission, the Court often
must craft doctrine that is driven by the Constitution, but does not reflect the
Constitution’s meaning precisely.”).
59. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 54, at 35 (“[T]he application of constitutional
meaning to the facts of a given ‘case or controversy’ is often mediated by judge-made
tests of constitutional law that are not most fairly understood as themselves products
of judicial constitutional interpretation.”). Two of the most important early
proponents of the distinction between constitutional meaning and constitutional
doctrine were Professors Lawrence Sager and Henry Monaghan. See generally
Monaghan, supra note 43; Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). Numerous scholars
accept the distinction between constitutional meaning and constitutional doctrine.
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 79 (2000) (arguing that Article III envisions that
“judges will offer interpretations of [the Constitution’s] meaning, give reasons for
those interpretations, develop mediating principles, and craft implementing
frameworks enabling the document to work as in-court law”); Charles Fried,
Commentary, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140, 1140 (1994)
(describing “constitutional doctrine” as “the “rules and principles of
constitutional law . . . that are capable of statement and that generally guide the
decisions of courts, the conduct of government officials, and the arguments and
counsel of lawyers”); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883 (1996) (arguing that in practice, constitutional doctrine
has priority over constitutional text).
60. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not
have attained to the Age of thirty Years . . . .”).
61. Berman, supra note 54, at 13–14 (citing Strauss, supra note 10).
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1.

The functions of implementation rules
Professor Mitchell Berman, one of the foremost implementation
rules theorists, distinguishes between “constitutional operative
propositions” and “constitutional decision rules.”62 Berman defines a
“constitutional operative proposition” as “the judicial statement or
understanding of constitutional meaning.”63 In other words, it is the
product of constitutional interpretation. A constitutional decision
rule, on the other hand, “states the test for deciding whether the
terms of the operative proposition are satisfied.”64 In other words, a
constitutional decision rule is a judicial implementation rule.
Berman argues that the primary function of a constitutional
decision rule is to enhance the accuracy of constitutional
adjudication.65 To borrow the terminology of science, the function of
such a rule is to minimize the sum of error costs resulting from “false
negatives” (judicial failures to recognize a constitutional violation
where one has occurred) and “false positives” (judicial findings of a
constitutional violation where none has occurred).66
Error costs need not be measured in a purely quantitative fashion
because sometimes a false negative can cause greater harm than a
false positive (and vice versa).67 For example, if the Equal Protection
Clause means that the government may not treat one group of
people worse than another for illegitimate reasons, the rule requiring
strict scrutiny of racial classifications is likely to result in an increased
number of false positives.68 Under this standard, the Court will treat
virtually any law that makes a racial classification as unconstitutional
even if the classification furthers a legitimate, not invidious,

62. Id. at 9.
63. Id. at 79–80.
64. Id. at 80.
65. See id. at 98 (“The consideration that would seem to enjoy the strongest claim
to legitimacy is an interest in reducing adjudicatory error.”).
66. See id. at 93 (“The most obvious factor that a decision-rule-maker should consider,
then, is how best to minimize . . . the sum of false positives and false negatives.”).
67. Id. (“A court could think that a particular decision rule is likely to minimize
either the sum total of adjudicatory errors, or the sum total of weighted errors,
taking account of a difference in perceived social disutility between false negatives
and false positives.”); see also Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1662 (arguing that in
formulating decision rules, courts may “assess the costs of error—things such
as the harm to the individual, the importance of the governmental interest
likely to be thwarted, the ability of the government to achieve its legitimate
aims by other means—and adopt a decision rule reflecting the relative costs of
each kind of error”).
68. See, e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1661 (describing strict scrutiny as an
implementation “rule that predictably strikes down valid laws but upholds almost
no violations”).
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purpose.69 But because of the great social harm that flows from laws
perpetuating racial subordination, a larger number of false positives
may be less costly than a smaller number of false negatives.70
Likewise, the strong deference that courts normally give the
legislative and executive branches in cases involving war powers
obviously increases the likelihood of false negatives.71 Courts will
treat Congress and the President as though they acted within the
range of their constitutional authority in some cases where they have
actually exceeded it. Still, this may be the least costly approach to the
issue, given the great harm that may flow from erroneous judicial
interference with battlefield decisions.
In this context, false
negatives” may be less costly than false positives.”
Berman also argues that courts may properly consider the effect a
decision rule will have on the likelihood that governmental actors will
violate the Constitution in the first place.72 A rule that creates a
substantial number of false negatives may not adequately deter
government officials from violating the Constitution.73 Similarly, a
rule that creates a substantial number of false positives may over-deter
or “chill[]” the actions of government officials in a way that
undermines their capacity to do their jobs effectively.74 If greater
social harm is likely to flow from a given constitutional violation than
from the threat of overdeterrence, the Court may appropriately
employ a more protective rule. If the balance of harms leans the
other way, the Court may appropriately employ a less protective rule.
Some considerations that are unrelated to accuracy still have a
claim to legitimacy. Among these are what Berman calls “fiscal”
and “institutional” concerns.75 Courts sometimes devise rules
designed, in part, to reduce the cost of litigation to the parties or
69. Gerald Gunther famously described strict scrutiny as “strict in theory and
fatal in fact” because the Supreme Court’s decisions that use strict scrutiny
virtually always result in invalidation of the statute at issue. Gerald Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
70. See Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1662–63 (“Cost-benefit analysis . . . offers
one explanation for strict scrutiny: Judges look more closely at laws that inflict
greater harms.”).
71. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) (stating that “judicial
deference . . . is at its apogee” when Congress exercises its war powers); United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (noting that courts give “utmost deference” to the
President in cases involving national security).
72. See Berman, supra note 54, at 93; see also Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1666–67
(arguing that it is appropriate for the Supreme Court to consider how its
implementation rule is likely to affect the conduct of governmental actors).
73. See Berman, supra note 54, at 93.
74. See id. at 94 (highlighting the negative effects of “overdeterrence”).
75. See id. at 95.
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to the court, to preserve the court’s “moral authority” or to
minimize “interbranch friction.”76
The concern with the weakest claim to legitimacy is what
Berman calls a “substantive” consideration, meaning a decision to
supplement or replace a constitutional norm with the judge’s own
substantive value or policy judgment.77 Like Strauss before him,
Berman recognizes that a decision rule based purely on the
judge’s belief that it will make the world a better place is
improper, although he expresses doubt that rules based on such
considerations are common.78
The Miranda rules as implementation rules
It is now time to turn back to Miranda v. Arizona, the case that gave
rise to the structural/pragmatic impasse described above. Can the
Miranda rules be justified as implementation rules?
Professor Mitchell Berman thinks they can. He argues that
Miranda can be read as announcing two constitutional “operative
propositions” (interpretations of constitutional meaning) and a set of
accuracy-enhancing constitutional decision rules (implementation
rules).79 As noted above, Miranda was based on the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. According to Berman,
Miranda’s operative propositions are that (1) courts should not admit
into evidence statements that have been compelled by the police,80
and (2) “compel” means the use of pressure inconsistent with
principles of personal freedom or dignity, even though such pressure
may not be strong enough to make the statement involuntary under
the Due Process Clause.81
Miranda’s implementation rule is that statements obtained through
custodial interrogation will be presumed to be compelled unless
police follow the detailed set of “procedural safeguards” described
above, including the requirements of warning and waiver.82 Berman
argues that these safeguards are best seen as accuracy-enhancing
2.

76. Id.; see also Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1665 (“Some constitutional operative
propositions may require courts to decide questions that they simply cannot, or that
they cannot without burdensome or intrusive evidence-gathering.”).
77. Berman, supra note 54, at 95.
78. See id. at 97 (“[I]t is hard to credit that courts should enjoy effectively
unconstrained authority to craft constitutional decision rules.”); see also Strauss, supra
note 10, at 194 (asserting that Miranda would have a “legitimacy problem” if it were
simply based on the Supreme Court’s belief that the Miranda rules would make the
world “a better place”).
79. Berman, supra note 54, at 51.
80. See id. at 117–18.
81. See id. at 120–23 & n.366.
82. Id. at 126; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966).
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decision rules.83 The Supreme Court noted in Miranda that it is
difficult for courts to tell what actually happens during custodial
interrogation because it generally happens behind closed doors.84
Thus, in any given case, it is hard to tell whether the police have used
custodial interrogation to compel a statement from a suspect.85 The
problem was exacerbated by the fact that the Miranda Court
interpreted “compelled” broadly, making case-by-case sorting of
compelled and non-compelled statements difficult.86 Miranda’s
procedural safeguards were supposed to help solve this problem by
reducing the likelihood that a statement obtained during custodial
interrogation will actually be compelled.87 If a defendant knows of
his right to silence and right to an attorney, Berman argues, and the
police are required to respect invocation of such a right, custodial
interrogation can be expected to produce fewer compelled
statements than it would without the safeguards.88 By reducing the
likelihood of actual compulsion, the Miranda rules reduce the
likelihood that a court will mistakenly admit a compelled statement
into evidence. Of course, sometimes there will be a question of
compulsion even where the procedural safeguards are followed, but
courts can decide such issues on a case-by-case basis.89
Professor Berman’s reading of Miranda as an “implementation
rules” case is clear and powerful. Whether it is based on the most
plausible reading of Miranda will be discussed more fully below.
II. DISTINGUISHING INTERPRETATION FROM IMPLEMENTATION:
THE CASE OF MIRANDA V. ARIZONA
A. Implementation Versus Interpretation
As discussed above,90 implementation-rules theory is premised on
two related propositions:
First, the primary function of
implementation rules is to reduce the risk that constitutional
meaning will be applied erroneously in constitutional litigation.
Second, it is improper for judges to devise implementation rules
based on “substantive considerations,” defined as the judges’ own

83. See Berman, supra note 54, at 132 (identifying the purpose of “deterring
police overreaching”).
84. 384 U.S. at 448.
85. Berman, supra note 54, at 127.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 127–28.
88. See id. at 128.
89. See id.
90. See supra Part I.B.1.
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substantive policy preferences separate and apart from those
embodied in the Constitution itself.
These propositions imply that constitutional interpretation,
defined as the effort to discern constitutional meaning, is a vitally
important activity that is necessarily distinct from constitutional
implementation. We cannot tell whether an implementation rule
reduces the risk that constitutional meaning will be applied
erroneously unless we start with some idea of what the Constitution
means.91 Similarly, we cannot tell whether an implementation rule is
based on the judges’ own substantive policy preferences or the policy
preferences embodied in the Constitution unless we have some
method for determining what the Constitution means.
If
implementation rules theory is to be useful, interpretation and
implementation must be distinguished from each other.92
Surprisingly, implementation rules theorists have said little about
the nature of interpretation. For example, Mitchell Berman writes
that interpretation is the process of determining “constitutional
meaning,” whereas implementation is the process of determining
whether a given action comports with that meaning.93 But he then
91. See Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1711–12 (“Repeatedly, the Court has come to
treat its decision rules as if they were operative propositions, and repeatedly the
confusion has warped the doctrine.”). Roosevelt calls the tendency to equate
Supreme Court doctrine with the actual meaning of the Constitution “the fallacy of
perfect enforcement.” See id. at 1651.
92. Understanding the distinction between interpretation and implementation
may also enable implementation rules theory to perform its intended function of
improving constitutional culture. Several proponents of implementation rules
theory have expressed the hope that recognition that certain constitutional doctrines
are actually implementation rules will allow the Court to modify the rules when their
premises no longer obtain. Such recognition may also permit more interplay
between judicial and legislative branches in determining the proper means of
constitutional implementation. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 54, at 16 (“[W]e might
find our political culture enriched by being able to contemplate constitutional
operative propositions alone, divorced from the constitutional decision rules which
are designed solely to govern litigation.”); id. at 101–02 (“[T]he distinction between
constitutional operative propositions and decision rules makes clear that courts
could afford Congress a more substantial role in [implementing the Constitution]
even if they choose not to defer to congressional interpretations of constitutional
meaning.”); Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1716 (“One of the virtues of the decision
rules perspective is that it allows us to see how judicial supremacy in constitutional
interpretation can coexist with fairly robust forms of departmentalism or popular
constitutionalism.”); Sager, supra note 59, at 1240 (advocating for “a vision of judicial
and legislative cooperation in the molding of concrete standards through which
elusive and complex constitutional norms . . . can come to be applied”). See generally
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 28 (2003) (“The Constitution . . . does
not live in our society as mere ukase. Disputes about the Constitution often raise
deep questions of social meaning and collective identity . . . .
[A]lthough
constitutional law may be useful for settling disputes, the Constitution itself is not
reducible to this function.”).
93. See Berman, supra note 54, at 9.
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asserts that because there are different “plausible conceptions of
constitutional meaning,” the line between interpretation and
implementation cannot be clearly defined.94 If one believes that
constitutional interpretation should be non-instrumental, one is
likely to draw the line between interpretation and implementation
differently than would a pragmatist who believes that
interpretation is just as instrumental as implementation. Because
Berman
considers
both
approaches
to
constitutional
interpretation “plausible,” he avoids defining interpretation in a
manner that would exclude either approach.95
This avoidance is costly. As noted above, the legitimacy and utility
of implementation rules depend largely on their relation to a correct
understanding of constitutional meaning. Unless there is some real
difference between the act of discerning constitutional meaning
and the act of implementing it, there seems to be little point to
implementation rules theory. Put differently, implementation
rules theory cannot get us beyond the structural/pragmatic
impasse described above in Part I.A if constitutional interpretation
and implementation involve exactly the same practical and
political concerns.
Constitutional interpretation, conceived as the first step in an
adjudicative process that involves both interpretation and
implementation, is a receptive rather than a creative activity. The
Constitution is a form of communication analogous to an ordinary
speech act.96 In both cases, the first step a reader must take in order
to deal with the speech act is to attempt to understand the meaning it
contains.97 This effort is receptive and non-instrumental. It involves
the use of ordinary interpretive tools, including determination of

94. Id. at 80.
95. See id.
96. Numerous scholars have seen a useful analogy between constitutional or
statutory text and an ordinary speech act. For some notable examples, see Larry
Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authority and the Authority of
Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 357 (Andrei
Marmor, ed., 1995); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is that English You’re
Speaking?” Why Intention-Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967
(2004); Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629 (2005);
Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 723
(1982); Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Not a Matter of Interpretation, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 651 (2005); Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, A Reply to Our
Critics, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 790 (1983). But see Mark Greenberg, Legislation as
Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in
PHILOSPOHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217 (Andrei Marmor & Scott
Soames eds., 2011).
97. See infra Part II.A.1.
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semantic content and analysis of grammatical and logical structure.98
It also involves the use of history and inquiry into the speaker’s
purpose. But the overall effort is directed at determining the
speaker’s meaning. Although knowledge of history or of the
speaker’s purpose may assist in determining the speaker’s meaning, it
may not appropriately be substituted for the speaker’s meaning.99 By
contrast, the act of constitutional implementation is the effort to
“deal with” the meaning discerned through interpretation. As
described in Part I, above, this effort may appropriately be
creative and instrumental, so long as its overall orientation is to
reduce the costs associated with erroneous application of
constitutional meaning.
The following subsections sketch out a distinction between
interpretation and implementation by focusing on the purposive
nature of the act of interpretation, the particular problems associated
with determining the meaning of the constitutional text, and the
methods appropriate to the effectuation of the interpreter’s purpose.
1.

The meaning of “meaning”
Practitioners of implementation rules theory have defined
interpretation as the act of discerning constitutional meaning. This
subsection’s purpose is not to provide a comprehensive theory of
interpretation, but to focus more narrowly on what differentiates
interpretation from implementation. Still, it is worthwhile to pause at
the outset and consider what “meaning” really means.
Mitchell Berman has identified several possible definitions of
“meaning.” These include “[u]tterer’s meaning,” “[w]ord-sequence
meaning,” and “[u]tterance meaning.”100 Utterer’s meaning is the
meaning that a speaker or writer intends to convey through words.101
Word-sequence meaning is the meaning that could plausibly be
derived from the semantic content and syntactic relations of a series
of words, irrespective of the intent of the speaker.102 Finally,
utterance meaning is the meaning that an interpreter ends up taking

98. For a classic discussion of the ways in which constitutional interpretation
relies on both semantic and structural analysis, see Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure
and Relationship in Constitutional Law 8 (1969) (noting “a close and perpetual
interworking between the textual and the relational and structural modes of
reasoning”). See also Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution
74–92 (1982).
99. See infra Part II.A.2.
100. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 43 (2009).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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from the text, in light of the interpreter’s overall knowledge of the
utterance, utterer, and other relevant context.103
Word-sequence meaning is obviously not an adequate basis for
constitutional interpretation. As Steven Knapp and Walter Benn
Michaels pointed out over thirty years ago, language is only subject to
interpretation because it is supposed to communicate meaning from
a speaker or set of speakers to a listener or set of listeners.104 For
example, imagine that you come across a rock formation containing a
pattern that appears to spell out, “Beware of the dog.” If you
attribute “meaning” to this pattern, you will only do so because you
posit some person—natural or supernatural—who placed it there for
the purpose of conveying a message. If you understand the pattern
to be an accidental occurrence, it would make no sense to interpret
the “meaning” of the apparent words. “Word-sequence meaning”
thus does not appear to be a true alternative to “utterer’s meaning.”
Rather, it appears to be a description of one of the means by which
the utterer’s meaning may be conveyed to the interpreter.
The same goes for “utterance meaning.” As noted above, Berman
describes “utterance meaning” as the meaning an interpreter actually
draws from an utterance, given the interpreter’s knowledge of
semantic and syntactic conventions and of all relevant context.105
Although interpretation based on utterance meaning draws on a
broader range of tools than word-sequence meaning—as it includes
all relevant context—the overall purpose of interpretation still seems
to be discernment of the speaker’s meaning.
Berman denies that this is so. To illustrate his point, he imagines a
radio station contest for free Rolling Stones tickets.106 The contest
organizer announces that it will not accept entries “received before
12:00 a.m. Thursday,” mistakenly believing that “12:00 a.m.” is a
synonym for noon.107 What is the “meaning” of the announcement?
As a matter of “word-sequence meaning,” the entries can be received
any time after midnight.108 As a matter of “utterer’s meaning,” the

103. Id. Berman also identifies a form of meaning he calls “[l]udic meaning,”
which he defines as “any meanings that can be attributed to either a brute text (a
word sequence in a language), or a text-as-utterance, in virtue of interpretive play
constrained by only the loosest requirements of plausibility, intelligibility, or
interest.” Id. Ludic meaning appears to be a category that encompasses the other
three, but with looser—and essentially undefined—constraints. For this reason, I do
not discuss it as a separate category of potential “meaning.”
104. See Knapp & Michaels, supra note 96, at 724.
105. See supra text accompanying note 103.
106. Berman, supra note 100, at 45.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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entries cannot be received until noon.109 As a matter of “utterance
meaning,” the entries may be received at either noon or midnight,
depending on the interpreter’s knowledge of context.110 Berman
argues that in this situation, nonintentionalist approaches to
meaning (word-sequence or utterance meaning) are more
plausible than the intentionalist (utterance meaning) approach.111
The announcement means what it says, not what the author
intended it to say.
The problem with Berman’s analysis is that it ignores the purposive
nature of both the act of utterance and the act of interpretation, and
the ways in which these purposes interrelate. When a person speaks
to another person, the speaker’s purpose is to convey a meaning or
set of meanings through words. Similarly, when a person interprets
the words of another, her purpose is to understand the meaning the
utterer intends to convey. Meaning does not inhere in words
themselves. Words are more accurately thought of as vessels that
carry meaning, or signs that point to it.112
These points may be illustrated by looking more closely at
Berman’s radio station contest. In this hypothetical, the contest
organizer meant to communicate an intention, namely, the time at
which the radio station planned to start accepting entries. The
contestants’ purpose in interpreting the announcement was to learn
the same intention that the speaker was communicating, so that they
could turn in their entries at the right time. The speaker’s use of the
wrong semantic convention (“12:00 a.m.” instead of “12:00 p.m.”)
made fulfillment of both the speaker’s and the interpreters’ purpose
more difficult. But did it change the announcement’s “meaning”?
Imagine first that every person who hears the announcement
understands that the radio station actually intends to accept
applications starting at noon. Perhaps they all assume that that
“a.m.” is just a typo, or perhaps they all know that the concert
organizer habitually makes this mistake. Where the word-sequence
reflects neither the speaker’s intended meaning nor the hearer’s
understanding of the speaker’s meaning, can it be said to reflect the
“meaning” of the announcement? Presumably not. The organizer’s
use of “a.m.” is like the natural rock formation that says, “Beware of
the dog.”
Because neither the speaker nor the interpreter
109. Id.
110. Id. at 45–46.
111. Id. at 47.
112. See generally, e.g., SAINT AUGUSTINE, ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE (R.P.H. Green,
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (describing language as consisting of signs—that is,
things that point to other things).
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understands this word-sequence to reflect the speaker’s intended
meaning, it is not a bearer of meaning.
Now imagine that some listeners understand that the contest starts
at noon, while others think it starts at midnight.
Whose
understanding accurately reflects the meaning of the announcement?
Berman thinks that it is more plausible to say that the “meaning” of
the announcement is that the contest starts at midnight, even though
this “meaning” does not reflect the organizer’s intention, because it is
“the most equitable resolution” and “is most consistent with the
functions that public announcements are designed to serve—to
provide clear notice and certainty, without requiring the addressees
to inquire deeply beyond the face of the document.”113 But public
announcements are, of course, not designed to provide “notice” in
the abstract; they are designed to provide notice of something. In
Berman’s hypothetical, the “something” is the time at which the radio
station intends to start taking applications. The “word-sequence
meaning” of the announcement misstates this. It seems strange to say
that the listeners who interpreted the announcement according to its
word-sequence meaning correctly interpreted the meaning of the
message, despite the fact that they failed to learn the “something”—
the time at which the radio station intended to start accepting
applications—they sought. It seems more plausible simply to say that,
with respect to this group of listeners, the announcement failed to
communicate the organizer’s meaning.
This is where the distinction between interpretation and
implementation comes in. The question arising from Berman’s radio
station contest is not, “What did the announcement mean?” but,
“What should we do in light of the fact that the speaker failed to
communicate his message?” Should we enforce the meaning the
speaker intended but failed to communicate, or should we do
something else? In the case of the radio station contest, should we
only allow those entries that were submitted after noon, or should we
also permit entries by those participants who submitted entries
between 12:00 a.m. and noon? These are very important questions,
and versions of them arise in all sorts of legal contexts.114 But they
are not questions of interpretation. They are questions of what to do
when communication (and therefore interpretation) fails.
113. Berman, supra note 100, at 46–47.
114. For example, even textualists like Justice Scalia recognize the doctrine of
“scrivener’s error,” which allows the Court to depart from the plain meaning of a
statutory or constitutional text where “the meaning genuinely intended” by the
legislature is “absolutely clear” but “inadequately expressed.” United States v. XCitement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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As this example illustrates, the core purpose of interpretation is to
determine the meaning that a speaker or set of speakers has
attempted to communicate to an interpreter through some form of
communicative convention.
2.

Determining the meaning of the constitutional text
Establishing that “meaning” means “utterer’s meaning” does not
solve the problem of constitutional interpretation, for the
Constitution presents two interpretive problems we do not encounter
when dealing with an ordinary speech act. First, who counts as the
“utterer” of the Constitution? The individuals who drafted it? The
Constitutional Convention that proposed it to the states for
ratification?
The various State Ratifying Conventions?
Some
combination thereof? Second, assuming we identify the relevant
groups of “utterers,” how do we determine the subjective intentions
of any multi-member body?115
The first problem—the identity of the “utterer” of the
Constitution—is not difficult to solve. In principle, the utterer whose
meaning matters is the utterer who has authority to speak with the
force of law. In the case of ordinary legislation, the relevant utterer is
the legislature empowered to enact legislation. In the case of the
U.S. Constitution, the relevant utterers are the state conventions that
ratified the Constitution and thus made it the supreme law of the
land.116 In the case of the Bill of Rights, the relevant utterers are the
115. One commonly stated objection to viewing the Constitution as an expression
of a speaker’s purpose is that numerous individuals with various motives and
understandings were involved in drafting and ratifying the Constitution, such that
the Framers’ and ratifiers’ “intent” or “purpose” is not discernible. See, e.g., Matthew
D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1374
(2000) (“Notwithstanding the common scholarly habit . . . of referring to the
‘purposes’ or ‘intentions’ or ‘motivations’ of legal bodies, there typically is no such
thing (at least for multimember bodies such as courts or legislatures).” (footnote
omitted)); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
277, 351 (1985) (expressing skepticism about the idea of legislative intent); Jeremy
Waldron, Legislators’ Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND
INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 329, 353 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995)
(same). Some scholars have argued that it is possible to speak meaningfully of the
underlying “purpose” of a document issued by a multi-member body. See, e.g.,
Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1517 & n.132 (2004) (“Of course the actions produced
by multimember bodies consisting of human agents can be produced for
purposes.”). I am discussing a narrower sort of purpose here: the purpose to convey
the meaning of the statement issued by the multi-member body.
116. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 427, 445 (2007) (“[S]urely it was the ratifiers’ views that counted
because only they had the authority to make the proposed Constitution law.”);
Monaghan, supra note 17, at 375 n.130 (noting that “the intention of the ratifiers,
not the Framers, is in principle decisive,” but expressing doubt as to whether such
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First Congress and the state legislatures that authorized amending
the Constitution.
The second problem—the difficulty in ascertaining the subjective
intentions of the relevant group of utters—is only a problem because
“legislative intent” is often conceived in imprecise and even
incoherent terms. A member of Congress, a state legislature, or a
state ratifying convention may have many different motivations to
vote for the Constitution or a constitutional amendment. The
member may do so out of a hope that the provision will have some
specific real-world effect, or out of a desire to show support for a
given party or platform, or with no specific end in mind at all. The
member might even vote for the provision without reading it or
knowing specifically what it says. But neither the hopes, nor the
motivations, nor the subjective understandings of the various
legislators involved in enacting a constitutional provision are directly
legally relevant. All that matters is what the members intended to say
through their vote.
The best way to understand this distinction is by analogizing a vote
to approve a constitutional amendment to a vote for a given
presidential candidate. In the 2000 presidential election, many
people voted for Ralph Nader.117 Some of these voters may have
actually wanted Nader to be elected President. Others definitely did
not want Nader to be elected President, but voted for him to register
dissatisfaction with the major political parties.118 Still others may not
have known who Nader was, but voted for him simply because they
liked his name. Although these voters had many different—often
conflicting—intentions in casting votes for Nader, they shared one
intentions can actually be discerned); Strang, supra note 20, at 966 (“The
Constitution’s original meaning is the meaning that enables the Framers and
Ratifiers to communicate their decisions to us, and for Americans to coordinate their
actions in accord with those decisions.”).
117. See 2000 Official Presidential General Election Results, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION
(Dec. 2001), http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm (indicating that
2,882,955 individuals (2.74%) voted for Ralph Nader).
118. See Andrew Cohen, The Case Against Protest Voting (Remember Ralph Nader), THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 18, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive
/2012/10/the-case-against-protest-voting-remember-ralph-nader/263721 (asserting
that those who cast “protest votes” for Ralph Nader deprived Al Gore of the
election); Ellen Willis, Vote for Ralph Nader!, SALON (Nov. 6, 2000, 3:36 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2000/11/06/willis_2 (“I’m voting for Ralph Nader . . . in the
hope that the Green Party will get 5 percent of the vote.”); Phillip Locker, Is a Nader
Vote a Wasted Vote?—The Case Against Lesser-Evilism, SOCIALIST ALTERNATIVE (Aug. 28,
2008), http://www.socialistalternative.org/news/article10.php?id=902 (“The best
way to gain the maximum concessions from the political establishment is to build the
strongest challenge to them. A strong vote for Nader could bring real pressure to
bear on whichever corporate candidate is elected to deliver concessions or else risk a
further erosion of their base to left-wing political challengers.”).
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intention in common: each knew and consented to the fact that his
or her vote would count toward the election of Nader and that if he
garnered a majority of votes he would be elected President. They
may not have wanted Nader to garner a majority of votes, and they
may not have believed it was within the realm of reasonable
possibility. But they knew what the effect would be if a majority voted
for Nader, and they consented to this fact. When it comes to voters,
this is the only intention that matters: knowledge of and consent to
the fact that the words for which you vote will have legal effect if a
sufficient number of people vote the same way.
The same principle applies to members of Congress, state
legislatures, or state ratifying conventions who vote for the
Constitution or a constitutional amendment. They know that if a
sufficient number of the relevant lawmakers vote for the provision at
issue, it will have the force of law. Because the Constitution conveys
meaning through a widely shared set of semantic and syntactic
conventions, it is not important to determine what the private
intentions or motivations of the ratifiers might have been. The
decision to vote for a constitutional amendment—like the decision to
vote for Ralph Nader—represents the intention to approve the
meaning ordinarily conveyed by the semantic and syntactic
conventions employed within the document, within the overall
context of the document’s promulgation. Thus, the important
question in constitutional interpretation is what meaning the
Constitution actually conveys, not what intentions or motivations lay
underneath it.119
3.

Meaning, purpose, and “instrumental” interpretation
If interpretation is the effort to discern meaning that a speaker
communicates, myriad questions about the proper modes of
119. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
LAW 144 (1990) (“[W]hat the ratifiers understood themselves to be enacting
must be taken to be what the public of that time would have understood the words to
mean.”); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional
Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1341–42 (1998) (“Even if we cannot know
the actual intent of the legislature, we can at least charge each legislator with the
intention ‘to say what one would be normally understood as saying, given the
circumstances in which one said it.’” (quoting Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation,
in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 268 (Robert P. George
ed., 1996))). See generally Barnett, supra note 11, at 66 (“Although we can choose to
use words however we wish, as Alice discovered in Wonderland, the social or
interpersonal linguistic meaning of words is an empirical fact beyond the will or
control of any given speaker . . . . Although the objective meaning of words
sometimes evolves, words have an objective social meaning at any given time that is
independent of our opinions of that meaning, and this meaning can typically be
discovered by empirical investigation.”).

THE
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interpretation remain. This subsection does not attempt to answer
them all, but focuses on the minimum requirements one would
expect for a good-faith interpretation of an utterance. This effort
involves the use of ordinary interpretive tools, including
determination of semantic content, analysis of grammatical and
logical structure, knowledge of history, and inquiry into the speaker’s
purpose.
The speaker’s purpose may not appropriately be
substituted for the speaker’s meaning, although the “meaning” of
broadly worded pronouncements may sometimes be virtually
identical to their “purpose.” At its core, a good faith act of
interpretation is receptive and non-instrumental. These points may
best be established through hypothetical examples involving an
ordinary speech act.
Hypothetical # 1: Imagine you are a mother with a teenage son.
You leave a note for the teenager that says: “Instructions for
Grandpa’s Birthday Party: 1. Get a haircut before the party. 2. Wear
that new suit I bought you. 3. Let’s do this party the ‘family way.’” If
your teenager is to interpret your command in good faith, what tools
would you expect him to use? At a minimum, you would probably
expect the teenager to determine its semantic content (the meaning
of “birthday,” “party,” “haircut,” “suit,” etc.) and its structural and
grammatical relationships (the haircut should come before the
birthday party, etc.). You would probably also expect him to take into
account factors such as history and purpose, particularly when
dealing with the broadly worded third instruction. You would expect
him to remember that in the past, when he was cheerful and loving
and open with others, you congratulated him on acting in the “family
way,” and that when he has been petulant or disagreeable, you have
given him the admonition: “That’s not the family way.” Finally, you
would expect him to understand that the purpose of the instructions
is to make for a pleasant birthday party for Grandpa and that you
have decided that a cheerful, loving, and open grandson with short
hair and a suit is likely to make for such a party. Notice that the
teenager’s expected act of good-faith interpretation is receptive and
non-instrumental.
You expect that your teenager will use a
combination of background knowledge and linguistic tools to
understand the meaning you have transmitted through your message.
Hypothetical # 2: Now imagine that the teenager only reads
instruction number three. He shows up at the party in long hair and
a t-shirt, but is cheerful, loving, and open. He is not purposefully
defying instructions one and two; he simply did not read them.
Imagine further that the party turns out to be a pleasant one, so your
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overall purpose is fulfilled. Did the teenager adequately interpret
your note? He understood your purpose and fulfilled it. But he did
not fulfill your purpose in the manner in which you instructed him,
because he never discerned the meaning of instructions one and two.
Although you are relieved that the party went well, you are likely to
have a “talk” with your son afterwards.
Hypothetical # 3: Now imagine that the teenager reads all three
instructions and understands the meaning you intended to
communicate, but he is unhappy about instructions one and two. He
thinks to himself, “Mom doesn’t understand today’s fashion! If I get
a short haircut, my friends will tease me and I’ll never get a date.” He
may also have thoughts like, “The party will be no fun if I follow
instructions one and two,” and “Why should I be bound by the desires
of a couple of old people who have already lived their lives?” Finally,
imagine that he thinks, “I am going to focus on the overall purpose of
the party. It will be a lot more pleasant if I follow instruction three
but treat instructions one and two as optional.” As in hypothetical #
2, he shows up in long hair and a t-shirt but acts cheerfully and
lovingly, and the party goes well. Has the teenager adequately
interpreted your note? He understood the semantic content of it,
and in this sense did better than the teenager in hypothetical #2. But
at the same time, he replaced the note’s meaning with its purpose.
He also acted instrumentally, allowing his own concerns to alter his
reading of the note’s meaning. Finally, he rejected your authority
as a speaker, declaring to himself that he should not be bound by
your first two instructions. In this case, the teenager’s act of
interpretation looks more like an act of defiance because his
reading of the note is creative and instrumental rather than
receptive and non-instrumental.
Although the teenager may not appropriately be creative and
instrumental in interpreting his mother’s request, he can certainly be
creative and instrumental in deciding how to implement it. For
example, when he tells the barber what kind of haircut he wants, he
can in good faith try to strike a balance between his grandfather’s
desire that the hair be “short” and his own desire that it not be “too
short.” Obviously, there is some risk of error—and if he gets the
balance wrong his mother will not be happy with him. But the
disagreement will be over the best way to strike a balance among
competing interests, not over whether it was appropriate for the
teenager to consider his own interests at all. In short, it will be a
disagreement over implementation, not interpretation.
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B. Do the Miranda Rules Implement Constitutional Meaning?
As described above, Mitchell Berman has argued that the Miranda
rules may properly be understood as rules for implementing the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination in the context of custodial interrogation.120 Berman
argues that the Miranda Court interpreted “compelled” to mean the
use of offensive police tactics that are inconsistent with the suspect’s
personal dignity.121 Because it is difficult for a court to discern
whether
compulsion
actually
occurred
during
custodial
interrogation, the Miranda Court decided to use implementation
rules (the warning and waiver requirements) that would reduce the
likelihood that compulsion would occur in the first place.122
The only problem with Professor Berman’s reading of Miranda is
that it is counterfactual.
In reality, like the teenager in
hypothetical #2, above, the Miranda Court never interpreted the
meaning of the term “compelled.”123 Therefore the Court did not
use the Miranda rules to implement constitutional meaning, but as a
substitute for constitutional meaning. The interpretive emptiness
at the heart of Miranda goes a long way toward explaining the
dysfunction that has been associated with that case almost from
the moment it was decided.
As detailed more fully below, the Miranda Court flirted with at least
three possible definitions of “compelled”: (1) involuntary; (2)
resulting from improper pressure or trickery; or (3) caused by
custodial interrogation, regardless of whether improper pressure was
employed. It ultimately chose none of these definitions.
A holding that “compelled” means the same thing as “involuntary”
would have made Miranda an extension of the Court’s long line of
due process voluntariness cases. In these cases, the Supreme Court
held that it violates the Due Process Clause to use involuntary
confessions as evidence in a criminal case.124 The Court considered a
120. Supra Part II.B.2.
121. Supra note 81 and accompanying text.
122. Supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text.
123. For this reason, the Miranda Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination has always been notoriously difficult to nail down.
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right To
Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2629 (1996) (“No one really knows what
Miranda means.”).
124. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433–34 (2000) (“[F]or the
middle third of the 20th century our cases based the rule against admitting coerced
confessions primarily, if not exclusively, on notions of due process. We applied the
due process voluntariness test in some 30 different cases decided during [that]
era . . . .” (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary
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confession involuntary if the police had obtained it by “overbearing
the will” of the defendant.125 These cases focused both on the
offensive nature of the police conduct and the perceived strength or
weakness of the defendant’s will.126 In cases in which the defendant
was perceived as relatively strong and impervious to police pressure,
the Court might admit the confession even if the police engaged in
wrongful and even illegal conduct.127
Conversely, where the
defendant was perceived as relatively weak and vulnerable, the
confession might be excluded even though the level of pressure and
trickery was relatively low.128
The Miranda Court did use language that sometimes implied that
“compelled” and “involuntary” are synonyms.129 But at the same time,
the Court explicitly denied that the two terms mean the same thing,
holding that a confession obtained through custodial interrogation
Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 465, 489–90 (2005) (describing the development of the due process
voluntariness test).
125. See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225 (“The ultimate test remains . . . the test of
voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If
it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.” (quoting Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (plurality opinion))).
126. See id. at 225–26.
127. See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 240 (1941) (determining that
prolonged interrogation of a prisoner involving sleep deprivation, at least one
assault, and denial of a request for counsel was illegal but did not constitute an
“infringement of due process” because these actions were not the cause of the
defendant’s decision to confess).
128. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1959) (holding that an
eight-hour interrogation involving some sleep deprivation and trickery violated due
process because the defendant was poorly educated, emotionally unstable, and
generally vulnerable). Because the voluntariness analysis focused the Court’s
attention on largely unknowable questions of free will, it was notoriously
unpredictable in practice and was not considered an adequate means of controlling
police misconduct. See, e.g., YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS:
ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 25 (1980) (arguing that the Court should “scrap the
‘voluntariness’ terminology altogether”); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will,
and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 863 (1979) (describing “the intolerable
uncertainty . . . of the due process voluntariness doctrine”); George C. Thomas III &
Marshall D. Bilder, Aristotle’s Paradox and the Self-Incrimination Puzzle, 82 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 245 & n.14 (1991) (describing the difficulty of applying
the prohibition against involuntary confessions and citing numerous sources to
same effect).
129. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (noting that the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the government from using “the cruel, simple expedient of
compelling [a confession] from [the suspect’s] own mouth,” and that “the privilege
is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will’” (quoting Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964))); see also id. at 467 (stating that custodial interrogation
involves “in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to
resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely”).
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could violate the Fifth Amendment even if it would be considered
voluntary under the Due Process Clause.130 Although the concern
about “compelled” self-incrimination arose from similar facts as
the concern about “involuntary” confessions, the Miranda Court
was reasonably clear that the one thing was not the same as the
other.131
The second possibility, which is similar to the one adopted by
Professor Berman, is that the term “compelled” focuses solely on
police conduct. If the police obtain a confession using offensive
techniques that are inconsistent with the suspect’s human dignity,
they have “compelled” that confession.132 This approach differs from
the “voluntariness” approach in that it focuses on police conduct and
spares courts from making difficult inquiries into the question of the
suspect’s free will.
Once again, there are aspects of the Miranda opinion that support
this reading of “compelled.” The Court discussed the need to
“eradicate” offensive police practices.133 It quoted with evident
approval Bram v. United States,134 a case from 1897 that equated
compulsion with the use of promises and threats to obtain a
confession.135 Perhaps most importantly, the Miranda Court devoted
a full seven pages describing techniques that “police manuals”
advised officers to use in order to “persuade, trick, or cajole” the

130. See id. at 457 (“In these cases, we might not find the defendants’
statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms. Our concern for
adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth Amendment rights is, of course,
not lessened in the slightest.”).
131. See id.; see also Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 43, at 443
(“[C]ompulsion for self-incrimination purposes and involuntariness for due process
purposes cannot mean the same thing.”).
132. Of the three definitions of “compulsion” that float through the Miranda
opinion, this one may be the closest to the Supreme Court’s treatment of
compulsion under the Fifth Amendment in the decades leading up to this case. See
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (“[Prosecutorial] comment on the
refusal to testify is . . . a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional
privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly.”); Bram v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897) (asserting that confessions “must not be
extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied
promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence” (quoting 3
WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL ET AL., A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 478
(Horace Smith & A.P. Perceval Keep eds., 6th ed. 1896))).
133. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 447 (“Unless a proper limitation upon custodial
interrogation is achieved—such as these decisions will advance—there can be no
assurance that practices of this nature will be eradicated in the foreseeable future.”).
134. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
135. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461–62 (focusing on whether the interrogator used
methods that “the law treats as legally sufficient to engender in the mind of the
accused hope or fear in respect to the crime charged” (quoting Bram, 168 U.S.
at 549)).
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defendant into talking.136 The Court’s focus on these techniques
implied that techniques involving pressure, trickery, promises, or
threats constitute compulsion. But the Miranda Court never actually
held that such techniques constituted compulsion, and it never
forbade their use. Moreover, the Miranda Court strongly implied that
the Fifth Amendment can be violated even if the police do not use
pressure or trickery: “Even without employing brutality, the ‘third
degree’ or the specific stratagems [from police manuals], the very
fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual
liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.”137 If techniques
of improper pressure and trickery are neither necessary nor
sufficient to violate the Fifth Amendment, they cannot be equated
with compulsion.
The final possible meaning of “compelled” in Miranda is simply
“caused by custodial interrogation.” This reading of “compelled”
implies that it is unconstitutional for police to engage in custodial
interrogation at all, even if they do not use improper pressure.138
This reading is supported by the Court’s discussion of the Fifth
Amendment as establishing a “right to a private enclave where [the
suspect] may lead a private life” and as “requir[ing] the government
to shoulder the entire load” in a criminal case and to “produce the
evidence against [the defendant] by its own independent labors.”139
This reading is also supported by the fact that the opinion repeatedly
mentions a “right of silence” (as opposed to a right not to be
compelled to speak) and a “privilege against self-incrimination” (as
opposed to a privilege against compelled self-incrimination).140
The Supreme Court did not choose this meaning for “compelled”
either. If the police engage in compulsion any time they ask
questions of a suspect who is in custody, the logical response would
be to forbid custodial interrogation altogether. The Miranda Court
did not do this. Rather, the Court allowed custodial interrogation to
continue so long as police followed the Court-prescribed “procedural
safeguards” of warning and waiver.141

136. Id. at 448–55.
137. Id. at 455.
138. This reading of Miranda is similar to the one offered by Stephen Schulhofer.
See Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 43, at 447 (“The Court did not hold
that a brief period of interrogation can involve compulsion. The Court held that the
briefest period of interrogation necessarily will involve compulsion.”). .
139. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Id. at 444.
141. See id.
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The truth of the matter is that the Supreme Court in Miranda did
not particularly care what the term “compelled” means. The Court
was interested in enforcing its own instrumental concerns, not those
embodied in the constitutional text, and therefore, it used
implementation as a substitute for interpretation. For more than
thirty years prior to Miranda, the Court had tried to find an effective
way to regulate police interrogation, first through the Due Process
Clause, then through the Fourth and Sixth Amendments, and finally
through the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination.142 The Court did not like the fact that police
sometimes used brutality or improper pressure.143 But it also did not
like the fact that the process disadvantaged ignorant, weak, and poor
defendants.144 The Court also disliked the fact that wealthy (often
white) defendants with the money and presence of mind to hire an
attorney tended to do better than poor (often black or Hispanic)
defendants who did not.145 Some of these concerns revolved around
the idea of compulsion, but some revolved around a more general
concern for societal power disparities and fairness.
For this reason, the Miranda Court was much more interested in
the “procedural safeguards” it was creating than in interpreting the
Constitution. By requiring police to warn suspects of their right to
silence, of the fact that their statements would be used against them,
of their right to counsel, and of the fact that an attorney would be
appointed if they were indigent, the Court sought to “level the
playing field” not only between the suspect and the police, but
between poor, ignorant suspects, and wealthy, knowledgeable ones.146
The hope was that these warnings would not only reduce the
incidence of police brutality and improper pressure, but would make
the system fairer generally.
This was a noble goal, and one that was in some ways achieved. But
it was not built on an interpretation of the term “compelled.” This
reality has had several serious effects on Miranda’s legacy.

142. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865,
866–87 (1981) (book review) (describing the Supreme Court’s efforts to regulate
police interrogation through the Due Process Clause and the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments).
143. See George C. Thomas III, The End of the Road for Miranda v. Arizona?: On the
History and Future of Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2000)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s concern about coercive police tactics).
144. See id. at 3, 6 (elaborating upon the Supreme Court’s desire to create a level
playing field in the context of interrogation).
145. See id. at 2–3 (characterizing the Miranda Court as intending to make the most
vulnerable suspects “more equal to police officers (and more affluent suspects)”).
146. Id. at 3.
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C. Miranda’s Legacy
The Miranda Court’s decision to create implementation rules to
prevent compelled self-incrimination without first interpreting the
term “compelled” has had several consequences. First and most
importantly, it is impossible to discern the Miranda rules’ relationship
to constitutional meaning, and therefore it is impossible to tell
whether they over-enforce, under-enforce, or perfectly enforce the
Constitution.147 One cannot make such a determination without
knowing the meaning of the constitutional provisions the rules are
meant to enforce.148
Second, the Miranda rules create the (very likely false) appearance
of over-enforcement or prophylaxis. When the Court tells the police
that they are constitutionally bound to do (or to not do) something
but makes little effort to demonstrate why the Constitution demands
this, the Court’s order is bound to appear arbitrary and
overreaching.149
This is the fundamental reason judges write
opinions: to justify their orders by showing how they flow from
interpreted constitutional or statutory meaning. Although the
Miranda Court described many aspects of custodial interrogation that
it disliked or considered pernicious, it never tied these back to the
meaning of “compelled.”150 As a result, the decision appeared to
many to be nothing more than a judicial fiat.
When the Court uses what appears to be an over-enforcing or
prophylactic decision rule, this is likely to diminish the role of other
constitutional actors in implementing the Constitution in at least two
ways. First, the perception that implementation rules over-enforce
the Constitution is likely to generate hostility from the constitutional
actors those rules govern to the extent that such rules imply that the
actors they govern are either incompetent or biased against the
constitutional provision the rules are meant to enforce.151 As a result,
147. Cf. Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1711–12 (arguing that confusion between
“decision rules” and “operative propositions” tends to “warp[]” constitutional doctrine.
148. See supra Part II.A.
149. Cf. Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1717 (“When the Court . . . comes to believe
that the meaning of the Constitution is exhaustively specified by a list of what judges
will uphold or strike down[,] it denies nonjudicial actors their appropriate role in
implementing the Constitution.”).
150. See supra Part II.B.
151. For example, Richard Leo cited several studies of police attitudes in the years
after Miranda was decided indicating that police “resented” the Miranda rules
because they believed these rules were “artificial, unnecessary and generally
impugning of police integrity” and “undermin[ed] the authoritativeness of their
relations with criminal suspects.” Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda
in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1003, 1003 n.14 (2001) (citing NEIL
A. MILNER, THE COURT AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE IMPACT OF MIRANDA 219
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such actors are likely to do the minimum necessary to comply with
the rules and to look for ways to get around them.152 The postMiranda history of custodial interrogation is replete with examples of
such police conduct.153 The fact that the Supreme Court has been
willing to approve or encourage many of these efforts to get around
or minimize the effect of Miranda indicates that the Court itself seems
to believe that Miranda went too far.154
More seriously, the appearance that rules are prophylactic tends to
make the constitutional provision the rules are meant to enforce
disappear. If everyone (including the police and the courts) believes
that compliance with the rules ensures compliance with the
Constitution, then compliance with the rules will be the only question
that gets adjudicated.155 As Professor Kermit Roosevelt III has shown,
(1971); Otis H. Stephens et al., Law Enforcement and the Supreme Court: Police
Perceptions of the Miranda Requirements, 39 TENN. L. REV. 407, 423 (1972); Michael
Wald et al., Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J.
1519, 1610–11 (1967)).
152. See Leo, supra note 151, at 1016.
153. See id. at 1010 (“[I]n some jurisdictions police are systematically trained to
violate Miranda by questioning “outside Miranda” (i.e., by continuing to question
suspects who have invoked the right to counsel or the right to remain silent)”); see
also id. at 1016 (“[P]olice have devised multiple strategies to avoid, circumvent,
nullify or simply violate Miranda and its invocation rules in their pursuit of
confession evidence.”); Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda:
Modern Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 397, 447–50 (1999) (describing police techniques for getting around
difficulties posed by Miranda requirements); Charles D. Weisselberg, In the
Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1135–54 (2001) (describing
phenomenon of police questioning “outside Miranda” and arguing that this
practice should decrease after Miranda’s reaffirmation in Dickerson); Weisselberg,
Saving Miranda, supra note 46, at 112, 177–88 (arguing that the Supreme Court
should “re-consitutionalize” Miranda and expand the exclusionary rule associated
with Miranda violations).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 633–34 (2004) (plurality
opinion) (finding that physical evidence obtained as the result of a Miranda
violation, unlike the physical fruits of an involuntary confession, can be introduced
as evidence at trial); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (“[A] suspect who
has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled
from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda
warnings.”); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1971) (holding that
statements obtained in violation of Miranda, unlike statements found involuntary
under the Due Process Clause, can be used to impeach a defendant at trial). It has
been argued that cases like these have “created the incentive” for the police to evade
the restrictions imposed by Miranda. See Leo, supra note 151, at 1020. However, the
Court has limited police officers’ ability to do so. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S.
600, 604, 616 n.7 (2004) (plurality opinion) (holding that a Miranda waiver is
ineffective where the post-warning statement is obtained as part of a deliberate twostep process involving unwarned interrogation and confession followed immediately
by warnings, waiver, and a reiteration of the interrogation and confession).
155. See Leo, supra note 151, at 1022 (noting that because police can avoid
suppression of evidence simply by complying with the Miranda rules, “Miranda . . .
reduces the pressure on police” to eliminate coercive or dishonest interrogation
practices “on their own initiative”); see also Martin H. Belsky, Living with Miranda: A
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once this occurs, the rules themselves become calcified, freezing and
often shrinking the meaning of the Constitution.156
This problem is particularly acute when implementation rules are
used as a substitute for constitutional interpretation. When the Court
fails to discern the meaning of a constitutional right before devising
implementation rules, there is no way to tell whether police conduct
that complies with the rules actually violates the Constitution.157
Once the rules are complied with, the appearance of prophylaxis is
replaced by the reality of deference. The police can do what they
want and are unlikely to be found to have violated the Constitution.
Recall that in Miranda, the Court flirted with the idea that certain
kinds of pressure tactics and trickery might constitute compulsion,
but never quite reached this conclusion.158 The Court also flirted
with the idea that custodial interrogation itself might constitute
compulsion because of the pressures associated with custodial
interrogation, but never quite reached this conclusion.159 Because
the Court never held that these practices constituted compulsion
(and indeed, never determined what “compelled” means), many of
the practices disliked by the Miranda Court are still used today.160 As
long as the police give the requisite warnings and obtain the requisite
waiver, they can still keep the defendant alone in a room and
question him for hours, using psychological pressure and trickery to
induce a confession.161
Reply to Professor Grano, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 127, 146 (1994) (arguing that Miranda masks
the decreasing protection given to individuals in the criminal justice system and
reduces pressure to reform police practices); Godsey, supra note 124, at 534
(imagining a set of post-Miranda police interrogation instructions that tell the officer,
“[i]n practice, once you give Miranda warnings, courts presume the confession will
be voluntary, so you can sometimes get away with applying a lot of pressure as long as
it is not really outrageous”).
156. Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1651, 1692–93.
157. See supra Part II.A.
158. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447–55 (1966); supra Part II.B; see also
Leo, supra note 151, at 1015 (“Miranda does not restrict deceptive or suggestive
police tactics, manipulative interrogation strategies, hostile or overbearing
questioning styles, lengthy confinement, or any of the inherently stressful conditions
of modern accusatorial interrogation that may lead the suspect to confess.”).
159. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460; supra Part II.B.
160. See Belsky, supra note 155, at 127 (“Interviews, questioning, and
interrogations are conducted almost exactly as they had been before Miranda, except
for the addition of warning cards in formal settings.”); Leo, supra note 151, at 1021
(“American police continue to use the same psychological methods of persuasion,
manipulation, and deception that the Warren Court roundly criticized in Miranda.”);
Patrick A. Malone, “You Have the Right To Remain Silent”: Miranda After Twenty Years,
55 AM. SCHOLAR 367, 367 (1986) (same).
161. See Peter Arenella, Miranda Stories, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 375, 387 (1997)
(“Miranda has actually legitimated moderately coercive interrogation practices.”);
Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 461, 478 (1998) (arguing that the Miranda warnings give police “a potent
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Moreover, the evidence regarding post-Miranda interrogation
demonstrates three important facts: First, after receiving their
Miranda warnings, the overwhelming majority of suspects waive their
Miranda rights.162 Second, once a person waives his Miranda rights,
he is unlikely to invoke them if the police start ratcheting up the
pressure.163 Third, once a person waives his Miranda rights, courts
are unlikely to find that any subsequent confession is involuntary,
even if the police use pressure tactics that would have resulted in
findings of due process violations prior to Miranda.164 These facts
indicate that once the police give the Miranda warnings and obtain
a waiver, they can engage in conduct that actually violates the
Constitution, and neither the defendant nor the court is likely to
weapon to sanitize otherwise questionable confessions”); Leo, supra note 151, at 1022
(“Miranda has helped the police shield themselves from evidentiary challenges,
rendering admissible otherwise questionable and/or involuntary confessions.”);
Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure To Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH.
L. REV. 1211, 1215 (2001) (arguing that police interrogators use techniques that
place them “so overwhelmingly in control of the interrogation” that suspects have
little real opportunity to exercise their rights).
162. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An
Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 860 (1996) (finding that
suspects waive their rights about 83% of the time); Leo, supra note 151, at 1009
(“[P]olice appear to elicit waivers from suspects in roughly 80% of their
interrogations . . . .”). See generally Malone, supra note 160, at 368 (“Miranda warnings
have little or no effect on a suspect’s propensity to talk. . . . Next to the warning label
on cigarette packs, Miranda is the most widely ignored piece of official advice in our
society.”).
163. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 162, at 859–60 (demonstrating that, in a
study of 129 interrogations, there were five mid-interrogation invocations out of the
108 suspects who initially waived their rights); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda
Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 653 (1996) (finding that, in a study of
182 interrogations, only two of the 146 suspects who did not initially invoke their
Miranda rights changed their mind and chose to invoke these rights midinterrogation); William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 988 (2001)
(observing that very few people invoke Miranda rights after questioning has begun,
even in response to coercive interrogation tactics).
164. See Garcia, supra note 161, at 475–76, 478 (asserting that Miranda warnings
provide law enforcement with a “potent weapon to sanitize otherwise questionable
confessions”); Leo, supra note 151, at 1025–26 (arguing that Miranda has not
deterred the police from using psychological pressure and trickery, but has “lull[ed]
judges into admitting confessions with little inquiry into voluntariness”); Malone,
supra note 160, at 377–79 (arguing that after Miranda, the pertinent inquiry shifted
from whether a suspect’s confession was voluntarily given to whether he voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L.
REV. 673, 744–45 (1992) (“The warning-and-waiver ritual that is at Miranda’s core
served to insulate the resulting confessions from claims that they were coerced or
involuntary.”); White, supra note 161, at 1220 (“A finding that the police have
properly informed the suspect of his Miranda rights . . . often has the effect of
minimizing or eliminating the scrutiny applied to post-waiver interrogation
practices.”). See generally Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000)
(noting that “[c]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a
self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law
enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.” (quoting
(Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984))).

STINNEFORD.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

1/9/2014 3:52 PM

THE ILLUSORY EIGHTH AMENDMENT

473

stop them. Because the interpretive heart of Miranda is empty,
persons subjected to custodial interrogation are given an
appearance of overprotection coupled with what is, for many, a
reality of under-protection.
III. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS: IMPLEMENTATION
WITHOUT INTERPRETATION
The Supreme Court’s current approach to excessive punishments
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is similar to its
approach to compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment. In both cases, the Court has failed or refused to
interpret a key constitutional term or concept—“compelled” under
the Fifth Amendment; both “unusual” and “excessive” under the
Eighth. In both cases, the Court has devised a set of implementation
rules that are driven by concerns largely independent of the meaning
of the constitutional provision. Finally, in both cases, the Court’s
approach has created a dysfunctional combination of interbranch
resistance and judicial passivity.
The story of the “excessive punishment” implementation rules is
more complex than the story of the Miranda rules. Whereas the
Miranda Court failed to interpret an important constitutional term
(“compelled”), the excessive punishment cases involve two
interpretive failures. The Supreme Court first failed to interpret the
term “unusual,” then withdrew its traditional interpretation of
“excessive.” Whereas Miranda created a single set of rules that apply
in all cases involving custodial interrogation, the excessive
punishment cases have created two sets of rules, some of which apply
to cases of adult imprisonment and some of which apply to cases
involving the death penalty and life sentences for juveniles. Finally,
whereas the Miranda rules were driven by a set of complementary
concerns (the desire to control police misconduct and level the
playing field among suspects), the excessive punishment rules are
driven by opposing concerns.
Rules governing adult
imprisonment are driven by a desire to avoid interference with
legislative power, while rules governing death penalty and juvenile
life imprisonment cases are driven by a desire to limit punishment
practices the Supreme Court considers pernicious (although not
necessarily excessive).
The Supreme Court’s initial failure to interpret the term “unusual”
led to a series of implementation problems, which then led to
additional failures of interpretation and implementation. This
cascading series of failures has resulted in a Cruel and Unusual
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Punishments Clause jurisprudence that serves as a symbol of
judicial overreaching, despite the fact that it is vastly underprotective in reality.
A. Partial Interpretive Failure: “Unusual” and “Excessive”
Since at least the 1950s, the Supreme Court has refused to
interpret the term “unusual” in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause. In Trop v. Dulles,165 a plurality of the Court stated that it was
uncertain whether the word “unusual” had any independent
meaning.166 The plurality ultimately concluded, however, that the
question was unimportant because the Court’s task was “simply [to]
examine[] the particular punishment involved in light of the basic
prohibition against inhuman treatment, without regard to any
subtleties of meaning that might be latent in the word ‘unusual.’”167
Although individual justices have occasionally taken a stab at
interpreting the term,168 the Supreme Court as a whole continues,
in line with Trop, to ignore it. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause has effectively been transformed into the “Cruel
Punishments Clause.”
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a punishment may be
cruel by virtue of being excessive.169 An excessive punishment differs
from “barbaric” or “inherently cruel” methods of punishment in that
it is not unacceptably harsh in itself, but is too harsh in relation to its

165. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
166. Id. at 100 n.32 (plurality opinion).
167. Id. While the plurality acknowledged that “unusual” might mean “different
from that which is generally done,” id., it ignored that possible meaning in Trop and
in subsequent cases.
168. For example, in Furman v. Georgia, Justice Stewart implied that the term
applied to punishments that were “wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed” and thus
comparable to being “struck by lightning.” 408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (per curiam). In the same case, Justice Douglas opined that “unusual”
means “discriminatory,” stating, “It would seem to be incontestable that the death
penalty inflicted on one defendant is ‘unusual’ if it discriminates against him by
reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a
procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.” Id. at 242
(Douglas, J., concurring).
169. For nearly 150 years, the Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that
excessiveness is a form of unconstitutional cruelty. In Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) 475, 479–80 (1866), Pervear was sentenced to a fine and a short prison
term for operating an illegal liquor store. He argued that this punishment was cruel
and unusual because it was excessive. Id. at 479. The Supreme Court declined to
decide the case because the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the states, but
stated in dicta that Pervear would lose on the merits, not because the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause did not prohibit excessive punishments, but because
Pervear’s punishment was not excessive. Id. at 480.
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justification in a given case.170 Traditionally, the Supreme Court has
tied the concept of “excessiveness” to the offender’s moral culpability
for committing the offense.171 For example, a life sentence would
likely be an unconstitutionally excessive punishment for a minor
offense like a parking violation, because such offenses do not
require any showing of culpability.172 On the other hand, a life
sentence might not be excessive for a major offense like murder,

170. See Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 588–97 (2005)
(describing the concept of proportionality in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
171. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (plurality
opinion) (“It is generally agreed ‘that punishment should be directly related to the
personal culpability of the criminal defendant.’” (quoting California v. Brown, 479
U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring))); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 366–67 (1910) (“Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who . . . believe
that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to offense.”). The Court sometimes divides the culpability analysis into
two separate categories:
“culpability,” meaning the blameworthiness of the
offender’s state of mind, and “harm,” meaning the injury caused or threatened by
the crime. These two categories cannot be separated from each other in reality,
however, because the blameworthiness of the offender’s state of mind depends on
the gravity of the harm he intends, knowingly risks, or fails to foresee.
The Supreme Court has described its culpability analysis in various ways. See, e.g.,
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983) (stating that the severity of the punishment
should be compared to the gravity of the offense “made in light of the harm caused
or threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability of the offender”); Enmund
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (“It is fundamental that ‘causing harm
intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the same harm
unintentionally.’” (quoting H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 162 (1968))); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980)
(“This Court has on occasion stated that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
crime.”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“Rape is
without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and
of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder,
which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion) (characterizing the death penalty as an “extreme
sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes”); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 667 (1962) (holding that it is unconstitutional to punish a person for being a
narcotics addict because addiction is an illness, and noting that “[e]ven one day in
prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a
common cold”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion) (“Fines,
imprisonment and even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of
the crime.”); O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting)
(noting that the state’s power to punish is limited by the severity of the crime, and
that “[t]he state may . . . make the drinking of one drop of liquor an offense to be
punished by imprisonment, but it would be an unheard-of cruelty if it should count
the drops in a single glass and make thereby a thousand offenses, and thus extend
the punishment for drinking the single glass of liquor to an imprisonment of almost
indefinite duration”).
172. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.11 (agreeing that the proportionality principal
would come into play in this situation).
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because murder convictions generally require proof of a high level
of culpability.173
B. Implementation Failures: Evolving Standards and
Independent Judgment
If a punishment is unconstitutionally excessive when it is too harsh
in relation to the offender’s moral culpability, we are left with a
seemingly insoluble implementation problem.
Punishment, by
definition, involves the intentional infliction of pain.174 How do we
determine whether a given infliction of pain is too harsh? We need
some baseline—some implementation rule—to help us sort cruel
from non-cruel punishments reliably.
Over the past half-century, the Supreme Court has vacillated
between various possible baselines, including most prominently the
“evolving standards of decency” test, under which the Court asks
whether a given punishment violates a current societal moral
consensus, and the Court’s own “independent judgment,” under
which the Court asks whether the Court itself considers a punishment
too cruel, irrespective of any societal consensus.175
In some early death penalty cases, decided in the 1970s and 1980s,
these two tests seemed to work well together. The Supreme Court
decided that the death penalty was permissible for intentional
murder because this punishment was imposed in a large number of
jurisdictions, indicating that it comported with current standards of
decency, and because the punishment was proportionate to the crime
in the Court’s own judgment.176 The Court struck down the death
penalty for simple rape177 and for felony murder where the defendant
neither intended nor directly caused the death because most states

173. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion) (upholding the
constitutionality of a statute authorizing the death penalty for murder).
174. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary defines “punish” as “cause (an
offender) to suffer for an offence.” Punish Definition, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/154671?redirectedFrom=punish#eid (last visited
Nov. 17, 2013).
175. Compare Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173–74 (plurality opinion) (using both “evolving
standards of decency” and the Court’s own judgment to determine whether a
punishment is cruel and unusual), with Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021,
2026 (2010) (using both “evolving standards of decency” and the Court’s own
judgment, but relying much more heavily on the latter), and Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (using “evolving standards of decency” but pointedly
refusing to use the Court’s own judgment as part of the test for unconstitutionality).
176. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174, 179–80 (plurality opinion).
177. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion) (expressing
the opinion that rapists are not as culpable as murderers).
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had eliminated this punishment and because the death penalty was
disproportionate in the Court’s own judgment.178
Outside the death penalty context, however, the Supreme Court
found itself unable to implement the prohibition of excessive
punishments consistently and effectively.179 One reason the Court
had relatively little difficulty deciding the death penalty cases was
that they involved the harshest punishment imposed in the United
States. Because this punishment was at the highest end of the
harshness scale, it was relatively easy for the Court to conclude that
it should only be imposed for those crimes, like murder, that are at
the highest end of the culpability scale.180 But what about
punishments less harsh than death and crimes less serious than
murder? To determine whether such punishments are excessive
for such crimes, the Court would need to find some reliable way to
determine where a given crime falls on the culpability scale
(sometimes called “ordinal proportionality”) and whether there is
a permissible fit between the crime and the punishment,
(sometimes called “cardinal proportionality”).181
The difficulty of using either “evolving standards of decency” or
“independent judgment” to determine questions of ordinal and
cardinal proportionality was demonstrated in two cases decided in
the early 1980s, Rummel v. Estelle182 and Solem v. Helm.183 The two cases
involved virtually identical facts. Rummel was a recidivist sentenced
to life imprisonment after being convicted of obtaining $120.75 by
false pretenses.184 Helm was a recidivist who received a life sentence
with no possibility of parole for uttering a no account check worth
$100.00.185 The similarities end there, however, for Rummel’s

178. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789, 797–98 (1982) (“It is fundamental that
causing harm intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the same
harm unintentionally. Enmund did not kill or intend to kill and thus his culpability
is plainly different from that of the robbers who killed.” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
179. Compare, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281, 303 (1983) (finding a
constitutional violation based on facts that were nearly identical to those presented
in Rummel—life imprisonment after being convicted of uttering a “no account” check
for $100 following six nonviolent felony convictions), with Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263, 265–66 (1980) (holding that imposing a life sentence on a recidivist
convicted of fraudulently obtaining a little over one hundred dollars did not violate
the Constitution). These cases are discussed more fully below. Infra notes 182–204.
180. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion) (describing the death
penalty as “an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes”).
181. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 18–19 (1993).
182. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
183. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
184. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275–76.
185. Helm, 463 U.S. at 281–82.

STINNEFORD.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1/9/2014 3:52 PM

478

[Vol. 63:437

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

sentence was upheld186 while Helm’s was declared unconstitutional.187
As these results imply, the opinions in Rummel and Helm differed
drastically as to whether a prison sentence could be judged excessive
under either the evolving standards of decency or the independent
judgment baseline.
According to the Rummel Court, the evolving standards of decency
test could not be relied upon to determine questions of ordinal or
cardinal proportionality because state practice was too varied to show
a societal consensus.188 Some states treated crimes like Rummel’s as
felonies, some did not;189 some treated recidivism more seriously than
others.190 It was not enough to say that Rummel’s punishment was
harsher than it would be in any other state, because in a federalist
system designed to permit varied state practice, “some State will
always bear the distinction of treating particular offenders more
severely than any other State.”191
The Rummel Court also rejected the idea that courts could
determine questions of ordinal and cardinal proportionality by
exercising their own independent judgment.192 Penologists, who
make their livings studying punishment practices, disagreed
among themselves as to the amount of punishment that was
appropriate for a given crime.193 If the experts could not reach a
definitive conclusion as to this issue, neither could the courts—
particularly without a “neutral principle of adjudication” that
would make excessiveness determinations more than a mere
exercise of judicial will.194
In Solem v. Helm, decided just three years after Rummel, the
Supreme Court came to precisely the opposite conclusion regarding
the workability of the “independent judgment” and “evolving
standards of decency” baselines.195
In contrast to Rummel, the Helm Court held that judges were
capable of using their independent judgment to determine questions
of ordinal proportionality.196 Judges could consider traditional
186. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265.
187. Helm, 463 U.S. at 284.
188. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 281–82.
189. Id. at 269 n.9 (listing the thirty-five other states that punish comparable
crimes as felonies).
190. Id. at 279–82.
191. Id. at 282.
192. Id. at 274–75.
193. Id. at 283.
194. Id. at 267.
195. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
196. Id. (arguing that “courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at
least on a relative scale”).
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factors such as actual or threatened harm, the defendant’s intent and
motive, and the defendant’s character (including his history of
recidivism).197 The Helm Court recognized, on the other hand, that
it is more difficult to determine questions of cardinal
proportionality.198 Although it is relatively clear that a crime like
burglary is less serious than murder and more serious than simple
larceny, it is harder to do the “line-drawing” necessary to
determine whether a twenty-five-year sentence for burglary is
unconstitutionally excessive.199
This is where the evolving standards of decency test came in. The
Helm Court held that courts could determine questions of cardinal
proportionality by comparing the sentence in a given case to
sentences imposed for more serious crimes in the same jurisdiction
and for the same crime in other jurisdictions.200 If a relatively minor
crime is being punished with greater severity than more serious
crimes in the same jurisdiction, this would be an indication that the
punishment is unconstitutionally excessive.201 Similarly, if the crime
is being punished more severely than the same crime is punished
in other jurisdictions, this too indicates excessiveness.202 Because
Solem’s life sentence was the harshest available under South
Dakota law, and his punishment was harsher than punishments
given for more serious crimes in South Dakota and for the same
crime in other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court found it to be
unconstitutionally excessive.203
The Helm Court did not overturn Rummel, but distinguished it
on the ground that Rummel had a chance at parole after twelve
years, and therefore his sentence was significantly less severe than
Helm’s.204 Thus the question of whether the Court’s baselines for
measuring excessiveness could be effective over a broad range of
cases remained unclear.
The Supreme Court’s next two non-capital excessiveness cases
demonstrated the almost infinite variety of ways in which questions
about ordinal and cardinal proportionality could present themselves.
Harmelin v. Michigan205 involved a first-time offender sentenced to life

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See id. at 292–96.
See id. at 294.
Id.
See id. at 291–92.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 291–92.
Id. at 302–03.
Id. at 297.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
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in prison with no possibility of parole for possessing more than 650
grams of cocaine.206 Harmelin faced the same sentence (life
imprisonment with no possibility of parole) as Helm. Was he more
culpable or less culpable than Helm? Possession of more than 30,000
doses of cocaine207 is a much more serious crime than utterance of a
no account check for $100. But, on the other hand, Harmelin had
no criminal record,208 and thus had not demonstrated the same level
of commitment to a life of crime as had Helm.209 How do we sort out
these conflicting factors? Ewing v. California210 involved a recidivist
sentenced to a term of twenty-five years to life for shoplifting three
golf clubs worth about $1200.211 Ewing faced a sentence that was
significantly harsher than Rummel’s but less harsh than Helm’s. His
crime was non-violent and involved a relatively small amount of
money. But the value of the property he took was more than ten
times greater than the money taken by Helm, and his criminal history
involved violence.212 How do we measure Ewing’s culpability, and
how do we compare it to the severity of his sentence? It was not
clear to a majority of the justices in Harmelin and Ewing that the
Court had the capacity to sort out these varying questions of
ordinal and cardinal proportionality with the degree of certainty
necessary to justify nullification of a legislative enactment, even
with the assistance of the “evolving standards of decency” and
“independent judgment” baselines.
C. Cascading Failures Part 1—Withdrawn Interpretation
In response to these seemingly insoluble implementation
problems, the Supreme Court withdrew its traditional definition of
excessive punishments. In Harmelin v. Michigan, two Justices (Justice
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist) held that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause contains no prohibition of excessive
punishments.213 A controlling opinion written by Justice Kennedy
announced that the Eighth Amendment contains a “narrow”
206. Id. at 961 (plurality opinion).
207. Id. at 1002 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(noting that Harmelin possessed a quantity of cocaine with “a potential yield of
between 32,500 and 65,000 doses”).
208. Id. at 994 (majority opinion).
209. See Helm, 463 U.S. at 279 (indicating that Helm had been convicted of six
nonviolent felonies).
210. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
211. Id. at 17–18, 20 (plurality opinion).
212. Id. at 18–19.
213. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(asserting that “the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee”).
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prohibition of “grossly disproportionate” punishments.214
This
“narrow” prohibition was, in fact, conceptually empty. Justice
Kennedy’s Harmelin opinion abandoned the traditional tie between
excessiveness and moral culpability, holding that “the Eighth
Amendment does not mandate adoption of any one penological
theory.”215 Legislatures are free, it declared, to make “fundamental
choices” about the appropriate justification for punishment and to
design the punishment to fit the choices the legislature has made.216
Punishments would no longer be constitutionally limited by the
offender’s moral culpability, but could be as harsh as the legislature
deemed necessary to further goals of deterrence, incapacitation,
rehabilitation, or any other legitimate government purpose.
This approach to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
amounted to total deference to the legislature, not merely as to how
to implement the prohibition of excessive punishments, but as to the
meaning of excessiveness itself.217 As discussed above, the term
“excessive” does not refer to the absolute harshness of a punishment,
but to the punishment’s harshness in relation to its justification.218 By
declaring that legislatures are free to use punishment to pursue any
legitimate purpose, the Supreme Court effectively delegated to the
legislature the power to define the meaning of “excessive.”

214. Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
215. Id. at 999.
216. Id. at 998.
217. The decision to defer to the legislature as to the meaning of a constitutional
provision—particularly a constitutional provision designed to constrain legislative
power—is exceedingly strange. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), “[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Deference is appropriate
where another governmental actor has superior legal or epistemic authority
concerning a given matter. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1061, 1072 (2008) (“[D]eference involves a decisionmaker following a
determination made by some other individual or institution that it might not
otherwise have reached had it decided the same question independently.”); Robert
A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal
Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 665 (2000) (“Judicial deference
acknowledges that, based on the interpretation of another branch of government, a
court might arrive at a conclusion different from one it would otherwise reach.”).
The various state and federal legislatures appear to enjoy no practical or legal
advantage over the Supreme Court in determining what the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause means.
218. See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 70–74 (2005)
(implying that punishments may differ depending on whether they are justified
under a theory of rehabilitation, retribution, incapacitation, general or specific
deterrence, denunciation, etc.); infra Part III.A.
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D. Cascading Failures Part 2—Substitution of Implementation
Rules for Interpretation
When the Supreme Court fails to interpret a constitutional
provision or concept, it can take one of two approaches to
implementation. It can refuse to adjudicate claims arising under that
provision, either by declaring the issue nonjusticiable or by adopting
implementation rules that are so deferential to the legislature or
executive as to make litigation pointless. Alternatively, the Court can
adopt anti-deferential implementation rules that allow the Court to
invalidate certain categories of government conduct without having
to resort to constitutional interpretation.219 Because such rules are
not built upon the interpreted meaning of the Constitution, however,
they carry with them an appearance of arbitrariness and
overreaching. Very often, such rules further interests that are either
unrelated or tangentially related to the constitutional provision or
concept at issue.
Since Harmelin, the Supreme Court has replaced constitutional
interpretation with implementation rules.
Because the term
“excessive” no longer has inherent constitutional meaning, the Court
now employs categorical presumptions of constitutionality or
unconstitutionality to resolve excessiveness claims under the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause.
1.

The presumption of constitutionality
As discussed above, the Supreme Court traditionally interpreted
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to prohibit punishments
that were excessive in light of the offender’s moral culpability.220 In
Solem v. Helm, for example, the Court employed the evolving
standards of decency test in conjunction with its own independent
judgment to determine issues of ordinal and cardinal
proportionality.221
In addition, the Helm Court announced a
moderately deferential standard of review for legislatively authorized
219. The one option that is not available when the Court fails to interpret the
operative constitutional provision is a non-deferential standard such as the
preponderance of the evidence standard. Such an approach requires actual
knowledge of the provision’s meaning so the Court can determine whether it is
“more likely than not” that the provision has been violated. See generally Tellabs, Inc.
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 329 (2007). Where the Court applies a
presumption—whether deferential or anti-deferential—it can decide cases without
actual knowledge of the provision’s meaning.
220. Supra Part III.A.
221. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983) (allowing courts to use their own
discretion in evaluating the different factors that need to be considered for
proportionality).
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punishments, declaring that reviewing courts should give “substantial
deference” to the authority of the legislature and the trial court to
determine appropriate sentences.222 Under this standard, reviewing
courts should not substitute their own judgment for that of the
legislature or trial court, but should simply determine whether a
given punishment was “within constitutional limits.”223 By using
moral judgment in conjunction with analysis of current punishment
practices throughout the country, a reviewing court could determine
whether a given punishment was unconstitutionally harsh in light of
the defendant’s moral culpability.
When the pluralities in Harmelin and Ewing abandoned the
Supreme Court’s traditional definition of “excessive,” they also
changed the implementation rules governing excessiveness claims.
First, they replaced the “substantial deference” standard of review
with the “rational basis” test, an implementation rule that imposes a
strong presumption of constitutionality.224 Under the rational basis
test, a statute will be upheld so long as it bears a conceivable rational
relationship to a legitimate government interest. Second, the
pluralities transformed the Court’s independent judgment baseline,
which involved comparison of the gravity of the offense to the
harshness of the penalty, into a threshold test that would allow the
Court to dismiss excessiveness claims without asking whether the
punishment at issue violates a current societal moral consensus.225
Third, by holding that the legislature could use punishment to
pursue any governmental interest it chose, the pluralities
transformed the question of a crime’s “gravity” into a purely
legislative decision.226 In measuring the gravity of a crime against the
harshness of a punishment, the pluralities indicated that the Court
should examine how serious the legislature considered the crime to
be, not how serious the crime actually is.227
222. Id. at 290.
223. Id. at 290 n.16.
224. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 27–28 (2003) (plurality opinion)
(providing that questions about the fit between the punishment and the crime are
“appropriately directed at the legislature,” not the Court); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 1003–04 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (upholding mandatory life sentence for narcotics offender with no prior
record because there was a “rational basis” for the sentence).
225. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (“[I]ntrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only
in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the
sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.”).
226. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28–30 (plurality opinion).
227. See id. at 27–28 (holding that it is the legislature’s prerogative to decide
whether a crime is sufficiently serious to justify a given punishment).
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After Harmelin and Ewing, the constitutional prohibition of
excessive punishments appeared to be meaningless.228 If it is solely
the legislature’s prerogative to decide what interests to pursue
through criminal punishment and which crimes are serious in light
of these interests, there would seem to be no situation in which a
court could find a legislatively authorized punishment
unconstitutionally excessive—particularly given the Court’s “rational
basis” standard of review. In other words, the implementation rules
applied in these cases amounted to a strong categorical presumption
that legislatively authorized sentences of imprisonment are
constitutional. Under these rules, the Supreme Court upheld a
mandatory life sentence for a first-time drug offender,229 a mandatory
sentence of twenty-five years to life for a recidivist who shoplifted
three golf clubs,230 and a mandatory sentence of fifty years to life for a
recidivist who twice shoplifted videotapes.231 Lower courts have
upheld mandatory sentences of twenty-five years to life for recidivists
who commit crimes as minor as stealing a slice of pizza.232
2.

The presumption of unconstitutionality
And yet, in cases involving what the Court now calls “categorical”233
challenges to excessive punishments, the Supreme Court has struck
down certain punishments as excessive under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. A categorical challenge arises from the claim
that a given punishment is Cruel and Unusual with respect to an
entire category of offense or offender.234 Between 2002 and 2008,
the Court held that it is categorically unconstitutional to impose
the death penalty on the mentally disabled,235 on persons who were
minors at the time they committed the offense,236 and on anyone

228. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 83 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(asserting that if the fifty years to life sentence imposed in this companion case to
Ewing “is not grossly disproportionate, the principle has no meaning”).
229. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997; see id. at 961 (plurality opinion).
230. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30–31 (plurality opinion).
231. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66, 77.
232. See Jack Leonard, ‘Pizza Thief’ Walks the Line, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/10/local/la-me-pizzathief10-2010feb10
(describing the use of California’s Three Strikes law against a recidivist convicted of
stealing a slice of pizza).
233. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010).
234. Id. (describing the Court’s prior use of categorical rules in death penalty
cases, and applying such rules in a case involving life sentences with no possibility of
parole for juvenile offenders).
235. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
236. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 (2005).
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convicted of a non-homicide offense against an individual.237 In
2010, the Court invalidated all life sentences with no possibility of
parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders,238 and in 2012, it
banned mandatory life sentences with no possibility of parole for
all juvenile offenders.239
The Supreme Court has accomplished these results in categorical
cases by employing a slightly different interpretive strategy and a
vastly different set of implementation rules than it has in cases
involving adult sentences of imprisonment.
In categorical cases, the Supreme Court’s interpretive strategy is
similar to the strategy employed in Miranda: the Court flirts with
various definitions of “excessive” without ultimately choosing any of
them. In some cases, the Court implies that excessiveness should be
measured in relation to retributive or deterrent goals.240 In other
cases, the Court adds rehabilitation to the mix.241 In still others,
incapacitation is included as a possible justification for
punishment.242 This approach differs to some degree from the
Court’s approach in “non-categorical” cases. In the non-categorical
cases, the Court implies that legislatures are free to use punishment
to further any legitimate goal.243 In the categorical cases, the Court
seems to limit the legislature to some or all of the four current
mainstream theories of punishment.244

237. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447, modified on denial of reh’g, 554 U.S.
945 (2008).
238. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
239. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).
240. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(determining that the death penalty is an excessive punishment for rape because
rapists are not as culpable as murderers); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (“The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes:
retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.”).
241. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420 (“[P]unishment is justified under one or
more of three principal rationales: rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution.”).
242. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (“With respect to life without parole for
juvenile nonhomicide offenders, none of the goals of penal sanctions that have been
recognized
as
legitimate—retribution,
deterrence,
incapacitation,
and
rehabilitation—provides an adequate justification.” (citation omitted)).
243. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality opinion)
(“Selecting the sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state
legislatures, not federal courts.”). The idea that legislatures are totally free to choose
the justification for punishment comports with the Court’s acceptance of so-called
“regulatory” offenses, where the legislature creates strict liability crimes to further
non-penal goals such as public health. Such crimes impose criminal punishment
without requiring any proof of moral culpability. See generally John F. Stinneford,
Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 659–72 (2012)
(critiquing the use of strict liability criminal statutes).
244. See generally Stinneford, supra note 243, at 720 (providing that the four
theories are “retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation”).
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Although the various definitions of “excessive” presented in the
categorical cases are more limiting than the total non-definition
presented in Harmelin and Ewing, they are not much more limiting.
Just as it is difficult to tell whether a statement is compelled when
“compelled” might mean involuntary or the result of improper police
pressure or the result of custodial interrogation,245 it is difficult to tell
whether a punishment is excessive when “excessive” might mean
harsher than justified by the goal of retribution or deterrence or
rehabilitation or incapacitation. The more “ors” added to the
definition, the more the definition descends into meaninglessness.246
In its categorical cases, as in its non-categorical cases, the Supreme
Court has made up for its interpretive failure through
implementation rules. But the rules employed in the categorical
cases are quite different than those used in the adult imprisonment
cases. The rules include most prominently a set of parameters that
defines which types of cases will get categorical treatment and which
will not, as well as a strong presumption of unconstitutionality for
punishments that fall within these parameters.
The Supreme Court uses three main criteria for determining
whether a given case qualifies for categorical treatment: the nature
of the offense, the characteristics of the offender, and the type of
punishment.247
The most significant of these is the type of
245. See supra Part II.B.
246. The Court’s willingness to allow the legislatures to rely on any of these
theories as justification for a given punishment makes “excessiveness” meaningless
because these theories embody fundamentally different conceptions of what is
excessive. Retributive theory concerns the relationship between the punishment and
the offender’s moral culpability or desert. See Frase, supra note 218, at 73.
Deterrence theory focuses on the relationship between the cost imposed by the
punishment and the cost it saves by deterring others from committing a particular
crime. See Frase, supra note 170, at 593–94. Incapacitation theory compares the cost
of punishment to the harm prevented by depriving the specific offender of the
opportunity to commit a future crime. See id. at 594. Finally, proponents of
rehabilitation theory argue that punishment is justified to the extent that it reduces
the risk that the individual will reoffend once released. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler,
The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and
Some Thoughts about the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2003). It is hard to imagine a
punishment that could not plausibly be characterized as proportionate under one of
these theories, even if it would be excessive under other theories. For example, in
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25–27 (plurality opinion), a plurality of the Supreme Court
seemingly had no trouble upholding a sentence of twenty-five years to life for a
small-time recidivist convicted of shoplifting three golf clubs on the ground that
it furthered the state’s interest in deterrence and incapacitation, despite the fact
that the punishment appeared wildly excessive in light of Ewing’s moral
culpability for shoplifting.
247. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022, 2030 (“The previous cases in this classification
involved the death penalty. The classification in turn consists of two subsets, one
considering the nature of the offense, the other considering the characteristics of the
offender. . . . This Court now holds that for a juvenile offender who did not commit
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punishment. To date, no case has been given categorical treatment
that does not involve the death penalty or life imprisonment with no
possibility of parole. When a case involves one of these two penalties,
the Court will give it categorical treatment if it also involves certain
vulnerable classes of defendant (e.g., juveniles and the mentally
disabled) or an offense less serious than homicide.
If a case fits within these criteria, the Supreme Court employs a
strong presumption of unconstitutionality. For example, in Graham
v. Florida,248 the defendant committed several armed robberies
between the ages of sixteen and seventeen, the last of which occurred
when he was one month shy of his eighteenth birthday.249 After
Graham’s final offense, the trial court that had granted him
probation for his first robbery revoked the probation and sentenced
him to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole.250 The trial
court based this decision on its conclusion that Graham was
incorrigible and that life imprisonment was necessary to protect
the community.251
The Supreme Court invalidated this sentence and held that it is per
se unconstitutional to impose a life sentence for a non-homicide
offense committed as a juvenile unless there is “some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.”252 The Court reached this conclusion by employing
the “evolving standards of decency” and “independent judgment”
baselines in a strongly anti-deferential manner.253
Regarding evolving standards of decency, the Graham Court
concluded that there was a societal consensus against the punishment
of life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders despite the
fact that it was authorized by the federal government, thirty-seven
states, and the District of Columbia.254 The Court’s rationale for this
conclusion was that the punishment was rarely imposed and that
imposition was concentrated in a relatively small number of states.255
This analysis contrasted sharply with the Court’s previous “evolving
homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole.”); see
also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012) (“In part because we viewed [life
sentences without possibility of parole] for juveniles as akin to the death penalty, we
treated it similarly to that most severe punishment. We imposed a categorical ban on
the sentence’s use, in a way unprecedented for a term of imprisonment.”).
248. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
249. Id. at 2019.
250. Id. at 2020.
251. Id. at 2019–20.
252. Id. at 2030.
253. See id. at 2045.
254. Id. at 2023, 2026.
255. Id. at 2023–26.
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standards” analysis, under which the Court held that rarity of
imposition was not sufficient to demonstrate a societal consensus
against a given punishment because rarity might simply indicate that
judges and juries believed the punishment should be reserved for the
worst cases.256
Put differently, the Graham Court’s “evolving
standards” analysis involved a presumption of unconstitutionality.
Given epistemic uncertainty arising from conflicting facts—the
punishment was authorized in a super-majority of states, but was
rarely imposed—the Supreme Court chose to let the risk of error fall
against a finding of constitutionality.257
The Graham Court also concluded that the punishment was
excessive under the independent judgment baseline.258 The Court
analyzed whether the punishment was justified under any of the four
current mainstream theories of punishment, and once again it
employed a presumption of unconstitutionality.259 The Court first
held that retribution was not an adequate justification for
punishment because of epistemic uncertainty regarding the
culpability of juvenile offenders.260 Even “expert psychologists” have
difficulty differentiating between juvenile offenders whose conduct
reflects “transient immaturity” and those “whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.”261 Therefore, juveniles “cannot with
reliability be classified among the worst offenders.”262 Deterrence was
also not a sufficient justification because the “lack of maturity and
underdeveloped sense of responsibility” observed in many juveniles
“often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions,”
thus making juveniles generally “less susceptible to deterrence” than

256. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(“[T]he relative infrequency of jury verdicts imposing the death sentence does not
indicate rejection of capital punishment per se. Rather, the reluctance of juries in
many cases to impose the sentence may well reflect the humane feeling that this most
irrevocable of sanctions should be reserved for a small number of extreme cases.”).
257. The Supreme Court’s other categorical cases also show a presumption of
unconstitutionality associated with the evolving standards of decency analysis. See,
e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426, 433 (finding a societal consensus
against the death penalty for non-homicide offenses despite a strong legislative trend
in its favor), modified on denial of reh’g, 554 U.S. 945 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005) (finding a societal consensus against the death penalty for
minors despite approval of this punishment in a majority of death penalty states);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (finding a societal consensus against the
death penalty for the mentally disabled, despite authorization of this punishment in
a majority of death-penalty states).
258. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2039–40.
259. See id. at 2028.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 2026.
262. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573).
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average adults.263
Incapacitation also was not an adequate
justification for life imprisonment with no possibility of parole
because it is too difficult to determine at sentencing which juvenile
offenders are truly incorrigible and which will grow out of their
criminal conduct over time.264 Finally, the punishment could not be
justified on rehabilitative grounds, since the assumption underlying
the punishment was that the offender could not be rehabilitated.265
The Supreme Court was only able to reach these conclusions by
using a presumption against constitutionality. Recall that in Rummel
v. Estelle, the Supreme Court held that because penologists could not
agree on the appropriate sentence for given crimes, the Court should
defer to legislative judgment and apply a strong presumption of
constitutionality.266 In categorical cases like Graham, the Court
employs precisely the opposite presumption: because the Court
cannot reliably determine whether a juvenile is immature or
corrupt, deterrable or undeterrable, a permanent danger to
society or capable of growth and rehabilitation, the punishment is
presumed unconstitutional.
E. The Legacy of the Supreme Court’s “Categorical” Excessive
Punishment Cases
The Supreme Court’s categorical approach to excessive
punishments is much more recent than Miranda, and thus its
ultimate legacy is less clear. Nonetheless, three consequences of the
Court’s decision to use implementation rules as a substitute for
interpretation are already coming into focus.
First, as with the Miranda rules, it is impossible to tell whether the
Supreme Court’s rules categorically prohibiting the death penalty or
life without parole for certain classes of offenses or offenders overenforce, under-enforce, or perfectly enforce the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive punishments.267
Because we do not know what “unusual” or “excessive” mean, we
cannot tell whether these implementation rules effectively minimize
error costs.
It is quite clear, however, that the Supreme Court’s categorical
rules under-enforce the Constitution in one crucial respect: they

263. Id. at 2028 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,
367 (1993)).
264. Id. at 2029.
265. Id. at 2029–30.
266. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 283–84 (1980); supra notes 192–194.
267. See generally supra Part II.A.
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only cover the small class of cases involving the death penalty or
juveniles given life sentences with no possibility of parole. These
cases constitute only one one-thousandth of one percent of all felony
convictions.268 The vast majority of criminal offenders come within
the strong categorical presumption of constitutionality announced in
Harmelin and Ewing.
Despite their narrow scope, the Supreme Court’s categorical rules
have created an appearance of over-enforcement that has fueled
political and legislative reaction. The categorical presumption of
unconstitutionality covers some of the most hotly contested political
issues of the day—the death penalty,269 sex offenders,270 juvenile
crime and punishment271—and has generated outrage and resistance
by many governmental actors affected by these decisions. After the
Supreme Court invalidated mandatory life sentences for juvenile
homicide offenders, for example, Iowa Governor Terry Branstad
announced that such offenders in his state would be eligible for
parole after sixty years.272 Similarly, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal
specifically cited the Supreme Court’s “atrocious ruling” invalidating
the death penalty for non-homicide offenders as justification for
signing a new law imposing chemical castration on sex offenders.273
Because the Supreme Court’s categorical rules were adopted as a
substitute for interpretation, the Court has few resources to deal with
the resistance described above except through the formulation of
more rules. At what point will the Court experience “rules fatigue”
and cease intervening when a state comes up with a new way to
impose a very harsh punishment that complies with the formal terms
of its existing rules? If the experience of Miranda is any guide, such
fatigue is not far off. When it comes, the existing categorical rules
will provide relatively little protection even for those they were meant
to protect.
268. See John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 902–03, & n.11 (2011) (noting the small
number of cases that are actually affected by these rules).
269. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, modified on denial of reh’g, 554
U.S. 945 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002).
270. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 446–47.
271. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S.
Ct. 2011 (2010); Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
272. See Branstad Commutes Life Sentences for 38 Iowa Juvenile Murderers, GAZETTE
(July 16, 2012, 10:05 PM), http://thegazette.com/2012/07/16/branstad-commuteslife-sentences-for-38-iowa-juvenile-murderers.
273. See Governor Signs Chemical Castration Bill, Authorizing the Castration of Sex Offenders in
Louisiana, OFF. GOVERNOR (June 25, 2008), http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md
=newsroom&tmp=detail&articleID=270.
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Finally, the substitution of implementation rules for interpretation
has left the Court with little capacity for determining whether a
punishment imposed on a certain individual for a specific crime is
excessive. For example, in 2011, the Supreme Court held that
juvenile homicide offenders have a right to individualized
determinations that a life sentence without possibility of parole is
appropriate.274 But as the Court previously noted in Graham v.
Florida, it is extraordinarily difficult to determine whether a given
juvenile is sufficiently depraved and dangerous to be considered
incapable of rehabilitation and to require lifelong incapacitation.275
Since the current approach to excessiveness requires courts to
consider not only individual culpability but also speculative claims
about deterrence, future dangerousness, and capacity for
rehabilitation, it is highly unlikely that this effort at individualized
determination will be successful. Instead, the Court will almost
certainly abandon the individualized sentencing requirement from
Miller v. Alabama276 in favor of a categorical presumption of
constitutionality or unconstitutionality.277
F.

Resolving the Dilemma Through Interpretation

As the discussion above indicates, in recent decades, the Supreme
Court has taken a bad situation and made it worse. The Court began
by partially failing to interpret the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, then found itself unable to implement the Clause effectively,
then withdrew the partial interpretation it had previously given the
Clause, and finally constructed a set of implementation rules that are
highly protective of a tiny class of offenders and completely
unprotective of everyone else.
This cascade of failures is the predictable, and even inevitable,
result of the Supreme Court’s initial failure to interpret the word
“unusual” in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. As
discussed above, it is virtually impossible to implement a bare
prohibition of “cruel punishments.”278 Pain is the very point of
punishment, and the line between justified and unjustified inflictions
274. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467–68, 2474–75.
275. See id. at 2475 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27, 2034).
276. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
277. The Supreme Court hinted at this likelihood in Miller itself. See Miller, 132 S.
Ct. at 2469 (“[G]iven all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about
children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think
appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will
be uncommon.”).
278. See supra Part III.B.

STINNEFORD.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1/9/2014 3:52 PM

492

[Vol. 63:437

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

of pain can be very difficult to determine. The evolving standards of
decency baseline is fatally flawed, and the independent judgment
baseline amounts to little more than the unconstrained exercise of
judicial will.279 It is not surprising that the Supreme Court ultimately
resorted to a system of categorical presumptions to resolve
excessiveness claims under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause. Nor is it surprising, given the Court’s general reluctance to
interfere with legislative prerogative, that these presumptions are
vastly underprotective.
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive punishments
would have been much easier to implement had the Court started by
interpreting the word “unusual.”280 In the context of the Eighth
Amendment, the word “unusual” means “contrary to long usage.”281
Under the common law ideology that underlays the Eighth
Amendment, a governmental practice that enjoys long usage is
considered presumptively just, whereas a governmental practice that
is contrary to long usage—an “unusual” practice—is considered
presumptively unjust.282 The fact that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause focuses on punishments that are “cruel and new”
implies that the core purpose of the Clause is to protect criminal
offenders when the government’s desire to inflict pain has become
unjustly enflamed, whether this desire is caused by political or racial
animus or moral panic in the face of a perceived crisis.283 In these
situations, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is supposed to
serve as a check on the impulse to ratchet up punishments to a new
degree of harshness.284
A prohibition of punishments that are “cruel and new” is easier to
implement than a bare prohibition of cruel punishments, and will
extend the protection of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
to a far broader group of cases. Recall Rummel and Helm: the Helm
Court took the position that courts could sort out questions of
ordinal proportionality by looking at traditional culpability factors
such as intent, harm, and offender’s character, and could use
comparisons to current intrastate and interstate practice to decide

279. See id.
280. See Stinneford, supra note 28, at 1770–71.
281. Id. at 1817.
282. See id. at 1815–17. The broader relationship between the U.S. Constitution and
the customary English Constitution has been explored by a number of scholars. For a
particularly provocative exploration of this relationship, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 9–34 (2004).
283. Stinneford, supra note 268, at 909, 969–70.
284. See id.
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questions of cardinal proportionality.285 The Rummel Court, by
contrast, argued that questions of ordinal and cardinal
proportionality are inherently subjective, and that any effort to
enforce a prohibition of excessive punishments would force state and
federal punishment practices toward complete uniformity—a result
that seems inconsistent with the premises of federalism.286
The Rummel Court’s objections largely disappear once the focus
shifts from “cruel punishments” to “cruel and new” punishments.
With respect to ordinal proportionality, the question is not how
culpable (relative to other offenders) the Court judges this offender
to be, but rather how culpable (relative to other offenders) an
offender like this has traditionally been judged. With respect to
cardinal proportionality, the question is not whether the punishment
of this offender for this particular crime is harsher than the rest of
society permits right now, but rather whether the punishment of this
offender for this particular crime is harsher than society has
permitted up to now.
This approach avoids the total subjectivity associated with the
“independent judgment” baseline because it asks the Court to
compare the challenged punishment to prior practice rather than
relying solely on the Court’s own moral and practical intuitions. This
approach also avoids the enforced uniformity implied by Helm’s
interstate and intrastate analysis. Because prior practice involves a
range of permissible punishments, any punishment that falls within
that range would not be considered excessive.287
But if the
punishment is new, unprecedented, or outside the range permitted
by prior practice, it may fairly be characterized as unusual.288 If the
punishment is harsher than prior practice would permit, it is cruel
and unusual.289
Finally, the focus on “cruel and new” punishments would not
require the Court to approve long-dead punishment practices that
were once part of our tradition, such as flogging and mutilation.
Under the common law ideology that formed the basis for the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, practices that fall out of
usage for a significant period of time lose their place in the
tradition and become “unusual.”290 If a legislature seeks to
285. See supra Part III.B.
286. See supra Part III.B.
287. Stinneford, supra note 268, at 972.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See, e.g., James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & Rawle 220, 228 (Pa. 1825) (“The
long disuetude of any law amounts to its repeal.”); EDWARD COKE, THE COMPLEAT
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reintroduce them, they will be treated with the same skepticism as
any other “new” punishment.291
The insight provided by interpretation of the word “unusual” is
important because we live in a world of “unusual” punishments. We
have experienced crime panic after crime panic during the past forty
years,292 and as a result, we treat drug offenders,293 sex offenders,294
juvenile offenders,295 and recidivists296 (to name a few) with a degree
of harshness unprecedented in recent history. For example, several
states currently impose a form of castration on sex offenders, a
punishment that was eliminated from the common law tradition in
the thirteenth century.297
A focus on “cruel and new” punishments would support the
Supreme Court’s decision to limit both the death penalty and harsh
sentences for juvenile offenders.298 Such a focus would also permit
the Court to engage in robust review of terms of imprisonment,299
thus protecting the vast majority of offenders who are currently
unprotected by the Eighth Amendment.300
CONCLUSION
The substitution of implementation rules for interpretation has
several pernicious effects on constitutional adjudication. Because
such rules are not based on interpretation of the Constitution, they

COPYHOLDER § 33 (1630) (“Custome . . . lose[s its] being, if usage faile.”), reprinted in
2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 563, 564 (Steve
Sheppard ed., 2003); Stinneford, supra note 28, at 1813.
291. See Stinneford, supra note 28, at 1817.
292. Stinneford, supra note 268, at 970; see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence
Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 807 (2003) ([A] moral panic [is a
situation] in which media, politicians, and the public reinforce each other in an
escalating pattern of alarmed reaction to a perceived social threat. The elements of a
moral panic include an intense community concern (often triggered by a
publicized incident) that is focused on deviant behavior, an exaggerated
perception of the seriousness of the threat and the number of offenders, and
collective hostility toward the offenders, who are perceived as outsiders
threatening the community.” (footnote omitted)).
293. See Michael M. O’Hear, Perpetual Panic, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 69, 73 (2008).
294. See id. at 69; see also John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming:
Chemical Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 559, 561 (2006) (describing the recent trend toward imposing
chemical castration as a punishment for sex offenders).
295. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 292, at 807–11 (describing contemporary
juvenile justice policy as the product of a moral panic).
296. Stinneford, supra note 268, at 923–24, 975–76 (describing the unprecedented
nature of the punishments upheld by the Supreme Court in Harmelin and Ewing).
297. Stinneford, supra note 294, at 563, 595.
298. Stinneford, supra note 268, at 973–77.
299. See id. at 973–78.
300. See generally id. at 903–10.
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create an appearance of judicial legislation. This appearance often
provokes political and legislative backlash, resulting in judicial
adoption of implementation rules that are largely underprotective.
The Supreme Court’s current Eighth Amendment excessiveness
cases are a perfect example of this phenomenon: the Court has
replaced interpretation with implementation rules that
overprotect one one-thousandth of one percent of all felony
offenders and vastly underprotect the rest. The best way to right
this imbalance is to return to the traditional judicial practice of
interpretation prior to implementation.

